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From Coverture to Contract: Engendering Insurance
on Lives
Mary L. Heent
ABSTRACT: In the 1840s, state legislatures began modifying the law of
marital status to ease the economic distress of widows and children at the
family breadwinner's death. Insurance-related exceptions to the common law
doctrine of "marital unity" under coverture permitted married women to enter
into insurance contracts and protected life insurance proceeds from their
husbands' creditors.
These early insurance-related statutory exceptions to coverture introduced
an important theoretical question that persisted for the rest of the nineteenth
century-and into the next-as broader legal and social reforms took hold.
How could equality of contract for married women be reconciled with the
traditional dependencies of the home? Equality of contract also introduced the
practical economic problem of how the lives of women could be valued apart
from their husbands when the law otherwise enforced their economic
dependency.
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The theoretical and practical issues were resolved for life insurance and
annuity contracts, the Article argues, by an increased emphasis on "natural"
differences between men and women when those differences comported with
traditional gender status hierarchies and dependencies. Gender-distinct
mortality tables and higher rates for coverage of women first appeared in
annuity contracts used to fund lifetime financial support independent of or as a
substitute for marital rights. Gender-merged tables and unisex rates generally
prevailed, however, in life insurance contracts used to protect wives and
children from the family breadwinner's death, a more traditional pattern of
household dependency. Gender-distinct rates thus tempered, in both symbolic
and practical/economic terms, the equality of contract recognized by the
statutory exceptions to coverture. The selective adoption of gender-distinct
insurance rates during the first wave of woman's rights activism illustrates the
role played by marketplace contracts in reinforcing the traditional status
relationships and dependencies of the home.
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How people count and measure embodies certain assumptions about
the thing they are counting; this was true in the nineteenth century, and
it is equally true today . . .. What people chose to count and measure
reveals not only what was important to them but what they wanted to
understand and, often, what they wanted to control.'
1. INTRODUCTION
In the 1840s, shortly after state legislatures altered the common law
doctrine of "marital unity" 2 for life insurance contracts, a leading American life
insurance company began pricing life annuities3 by using separate male and
female mortality tables to assess the risk of life contingencies.4 Until then,
gender-merged mortality tables5 and unisex premium rates for insurance
coverage of men and women had been the industry norm.6 The change from
merged to separate tables for annuities and the subsequent selective adoption of
gender-distinct rates for life insurance7 resulted in higher rates for coverage of
female lives,8 and in the case of life insurance, sometimes in outright denial of
coverage of women.9
1. PATRICIA CLINE COHEN, A CALCULATING PEOPLE: THE SPREAD OF NUMERACY IN EARLY
AMERICA 206, 211 (1982) (emphasis omitted and sentence order reversed).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. Life annuities provide financial protection against outliving one's assets by providing income to
the annuitant for life. An annuitant with a greater probability of having a long remaining life would be
charged a higher amount for a life annuity (or alternatively, would receive lower annual income
amounts) than someone with a shorter remaining life expectancy.
4. See infra Parts II.B and III.C. In the nineteenth century, as now, the commercialclife insurance
industry justified its premium rates and policy benefits by reference to actuarial science, a professional
discipline that applies mathematical and statistical methods to assess risk. Insurance companies use risk
assessment and interest rate assumptions to price their products as well as to establish adequate financial
reserves and to value their policy obligations. Actuaries assess the risk of life contingencies by studying
past mortality rates, arranged in tables showing the probabilities of death and survival at each age. In
addition to interest rate assumptions and mortality risk assessments, companies add in a margin of safety
in pricing products. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986) (discussing theoretical issues and practical problems in pricing
insurance products).
5. Gender-merged tables report rates of mortality at various ages by combining rather than
separating the mortality experience of males and females.
6. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
7. Life insurance protects the insured's beneficiaries against financial loss from the untimely death
of the insured. An insured with a greater probability of having a long remaining life would be charged a
lower premium for life insurance benefits payable at death than someone with a shorter remaining life
expectancy.
8. I use the term "lives" to refer to the persons insured under life insurance or life annuity contracts
rather than to the policy owners or beneficiaries. From an actuarial risk perspective, life insurance
provides a mirror image of a life annuity, so that a person with a longer life expectancy would pay
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This Article examines the development of gender-distinct insurance rates
during the first wave of woman's rights activism, beginning in the antebellum
period and ending with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.10
The origins and selective use of these rates reveal how legal reforms and
dominant gender ideologies" during and after the antebellum period influenced
the adoption of gender as an insurance contract pricing category. This story
offers a more complete account of variation in the use of gender in pricing than
one focused solely on actuarial or economic factors 2 and illustrates the
transition from coverture to separate contract rights for married women in an
unexplored subset of marketplace contracts used to facilitate family support.' 3
Prior to "first wave" legal reforms, married women generally had no
separate capacity to enter into contracts. Under coverture and the common law
fiction of "marital unity," a husband and wife became one person, represented
legally by the husband. Wives came under their husbands' protective cover in
the legal status known as "coverture," and thus were restricted in their capacity
to enter into contracts, to own property, and to file suit in their own names.14
Simply put, unless certain equitable doctrines applied, wives became legally
invisible' 5 and, under law, economically dependent on their husbands. They
could not contract for insurance coverage on their own or their husbands' lives.
Coverture's restrictions thus extended beyond the family into markets and
society.
higher rates for a life annuity than a person with a shorter life expectancy, and would pay lower rates for
life insurance than someone with a shorter life expectancy. Beginning in the antebellum period,
insurance companies charged higher rates for life annuities for women than for men of the same age. As
discussed in Part IlI.B, when companies in the nineteenth century charged gender-differentiated rates for
life insurance coverage, they also charged higher rates for insurance on women's lives.
9. See discussion infra Part III.B.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (upholding the 1920
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment).
11. Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman 's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's
History, in TOWARD AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF WOMEN: ESSAYS BY LINDA K. KERBER 159, 170
(1997).
12. Historical accounts of industry actuarial practice tend to focus on advances made during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in statistical, demographic, and actuarial methodology and analysis.
See, e.g., LAURIE DENNETT, MIND OVER DATA: AN ACTUARIAL HISTORY 1 (2004); HISTORY OF
ACTUARIAL SCIENCE (Steven Haberman & Trevor A. Sibbett eds., 1995). However, accounts using
other methodologies and disciplines have added to that understanding by tracing how life insurance
developed into a new discourse about risk and security as well as a business that made judgments about
human life by determining how much and who should be paid under purchased policies. See, e.g.,
TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH SOCIETY, 1800-1914 (2009);
SHARON ANN MURPHY, INVESTING IN LIFE: INSURANCE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2010).
13. Although Sharon Ann Murphy's study of American life insurance in the antebellum period
provides much useful information about antebellum life insurance companies and the context in which
they operated, it focuses primarily on ordinary life insurance and not on life annuities. MURPHY, supra
note 12.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century
America, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 346, 347 (1979).
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The insurance-related statutory exceptions to coverture, which were
adopted by several states after the financial panic and economic depression of
the late 1830s and early 1840s,16 altered the common law by permitting married
women to contract for insurance and by protecting their life insurance proceeds
from the claims of their husbands' creditors. These reforms also marked a step
toward separate contract and property rights for married women during the
antebellum period, a time of transition in the law of marital status and in the
law of contract.
The conflict introduced in the insurance setting between coverture and a
more egalitarian contractual model raised fundamental issues fiercely contested
in the legal and political debates of the period. Significantly, before the Civil
War, debates regarding legal transitions in the law of contract, 7 fueled by
struggles over slavery, led to a new emphasis on the distinction between home
and the marketplace. Mainstream abolitionist theorists challenged slavery and
at the same time legitimized free labor contracts by drawing a sharp new
distinction between the freedom and equality of contracting parties in the
marketplace and the status relations and dependencies of the home.' 8 Women's
rights theorists within the abolitionist movement argued instead for the equality
of the marriage contract, contrasting the goal of equality or self-ownership in
marriage with bondage or other dependency relationships.1 9
From a common law perspective, the recognition of separate contract rights
for married women in commercial insurance markets presented the question of
how the freedom and equality of contracting parties in the marketplace could be
reconciled with the legally established dependency relationships of the home.
Because the early insurance-related statutory exceptions to coverture left the
law of marital status otherwise largely intact, they also introduced the economic
problem of how to value the lives of wives apart from their husbands when the
law generally enforced women's legal and economic dependency. Shortly after
these statutory changes, a leading private insurance company introduced
'modernized" actuarial risk categories that defined and quantified "natural"
differences between men and women.
The contract pricing distinctions adopted in the nineteenth century by
private commercial life insurance companies, I argue, resolved the conflict
16. Id. at 349, 356; see also MURPHY, supra note 12, at 137 (noting that the "nominal value of
commodities, land, and other assets fell by 40% under the deflationary pressures" of the panic of 1837
and depression of 1839-43); see generally EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE: BANKRUPTCY
AND COMMERCIAL SOCIETY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 32-41 (2001) (describing the financial panic of
1837 and the economic depression of 1839 as the "most important proximate causes" of business failure
for bankrupts on federal court dockets under the short-lived federal Bankruptcy Act of 1841).
17. See generally, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860, at 186-88, 207-10 (1977) (describing the transition from paternalism in employment relationships
to a contractarian framework).
18. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE
MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 175-81 (1998).
19. Id. at 184; see also discussion infra Part lI.C.
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posed by the statutory exceptions to coverture by translating traditional marital
status hierarchies and dependencies into new marketplace terms. The
development of mortality tables and rates categorized by gender reflected
perceived "natural" differences between the sexes, in which women were
viewed as inferior, as physically and economically dependent on men, and as
confined by nature to maternal and domestic roles.
This account of legal and ideological influences on nineteenth century
20actuarial practices illuminates the social meaning of gender-differentiated
pricing as both analogous to and distinct from that of the race-differentiated
pricing practices of life insurance companies from Reconstruction to the
21beginning of the modem Civil Rights Era. Compared to the history of race-
based insurance practices, however, the historical roots of gender-based
insurance pricing categories have remained largely unexamined.22 Although
gender-based pricing classifications by modern private commercial insurance
companies have attracted critical commentary by legal scholars for many
23decades, little attention has been paid to their historical origins.
Such an examination, although long overdue, benefits from the rich
scholarship of the last several decades on nineteenth-century legal history and
nineteenth-century views of gender as well as new perspectives on the
dynamics of legal change. Legal historians have shown in other contexts24 how
status relationships threatened by political activism and legislative reform may
be reinforced and modernized through modification or reformulation of legal
doctrine. This scholarship, as well as work tracing the modernization of marital
status law more generally, 25 provides valuable context for and insight into the
original meaning of gender-distinct insurance pricing.
20. See Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, 91 AM. HIST. REV. 1053,
1067-69, 1073 (1986). In her influential essay, Scott proposed a core definition of gender that rested on
an integral connection between two propositions: "gender is a constitutive element of social
relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes and gender is a primary way of
signifying relationships of power." Id. at 1067. Under Scott's formulation, gender as a constitutive
element of social relationships involves interrelated elements of culturally available symbols and
normative concepts that set forth interpretations of the meanings of symbols, and is constructed through
the polity and the economy as well as through kinship and subjective psychological identity. Id. at 1067-
69.
21. See, e.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, I AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 316 (1944) (describing race-based insurance practices).
22. A notable recent exception includes MURPHY, supra note 12.
23. But see MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 35-62 (2010) (examining the historical use of race and gender by courts as a
valuation factor in the computation of tort damages).
24. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
25. See, e.g., HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2002); JOAN HOFF,
LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 117-91 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, The
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J.
2127 (1994).
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Like the now-rejected race-based life insurance pricing practices of the
past, gender-distinct pricing developed as a result of mortality classifications
defined by the cultural meaning of perceived natural or biological difference. 26
The use of mortality categories defined by race and gender and other
developments in actuarial methodology revealed mortality trends that
companies took into account in various ways to ensure profitability. Unlike
explicitly race-based pricing, which was discontinued in the modem Civil
27Rights Era despite continuing race-correlated mortality differentials, gender-
distinct pricing remains a common commercial practice. In the 1970s and
1980s, such gender-based distinctions were invalidated under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment-related insurance and retirement
benefits, 28 leaving a discontinuity between insurance and annuity pricing
practices in the employment setting compared to private insurance obtained
outside of the employment setting.29
The historical roots of a numerical category, as Patricia Cline Cohen has
argued, reveal how the "concerns of the moment led to the reformulation, along
numerical lines, of a subject," about which "people were once content to be
imprecise[.]" 30 For after a "particular form of enumeration has become
accepted, familiar, and established, it is harder to read its meaning than at the
time of its origin."3' The origins of gender-distinct life insurance and annuity
rates thus provide important context for understanding their continued and
26. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Introduction, On Reading and Understanding Scientific Racism: A
Brief Introduction to the Work and World of Frederick L. Hoffman, in FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, RACE
TRAITS AND TENDENCIES OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO (Publ'ns Am. Econ. Ass'n, The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 2004) (1896) (describing the racial views of Hoffman and others at the time Hoffman of
the Prudential Insurance Company developed his influential race-based mortality classifications).
27. Mary L. Heen, Ending Jin Crow Life Insurance Rates, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 360, 379-83
(2009).
28. See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Comp. Plans v.
Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); L.A. Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
29. In the United States, no federal statute prohibits gender-distinct pricing of life insurance or
annuities provided outside of the employment context; only Montana prohibits gender-distinct life
insurance and annuity rates or benefits as a matter of state law. MONT. CODE ANN. §49-2-309 (2010). In
a significant recent development in Europe, in March 2011 the Court of Justice of the European Union
ruled that different insurance rates or benefits for men and women constitutes sex discrimination
incompatible with the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights. Member states are not
permitted to deviate from that principle in their national legislation, as of December 21, 2012. Case C-
236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL v. Council, 2011 E.C.R. 1-0000. At
the time of the ruling all twenty-seven member states permitted gender-distinct rates for life insurance
and annuities.
30. COHEN, supra note 1, at 207.
31. Id. The five censuses preceding the census of 1840, for example, "had gradually departed from
the Constitution's bare requirement to count the total population, first by creating, then by progressively
refining, categories based on age, sex, and color." Id. at 176-77. See also MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE
AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 4 (1988) (observing that census statisticians, sometimes in
consultation with and sometimes in opposition to political leaders, have "determined the categories and
classifications used to interpret population change" and have "created and shaped the very concepts we
use to understand social change.").
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expanded use32 in private commercial life insurance markets3 by revealing the
cultural work performed by such practices as they evolved over time.
When differentiated by gender, insurance contract pricing reflected the
categorization of women's lives as providing a lesser amount of financial
security, or as being of lesser economic value when considered apart from their
husbands. Those pricing differentials thus translated into modernized
contractual form the gendered patterns of household status and dependency
previously enforced by coverture. When not differentiated by gender, insurance
contract pricing reflected the status of men under coverture as "providers," who
during life were legally obligated to support their dependent wives and
children. Thus, men's lives tended to be used as a "unisex" measuring standard
for life insurance products that provided benefits to dependents at the family
breadwinner's death.
Although mortality trends34 and advances in actuarial and statistical
methodology35 provide necessary perspective for this story, they fail to provide
a full explanation for variation in the use of race- and gender-based mortality
classifications in insurance markets during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Both before and after the Civil War, I argue, the pattern of pricing
adopted by the life insurance industry in various markets for insurance reflected
elite and middle-class anxieties about gender relations amid industrialization
and the end of slavery; in addition, the coverage restrictions and pricing
policies adopted by the insurance industry reinforced the underlying ideologies
that gave rise to those anxieties.
The discussion of those early insurance pricing practices proceeds as
follows. Part II describes the antebellum legal reforms in marital status law that
immediately preceded the first use of gender-differentiated rates, examines the
actuarial developments leading to their use for life annuities but not for life
insurance, and traces the influence of legal and social changes in both Great
Britain and in America on the adoption of gender-distinct rates for life
annuities. Part III, drawing from and building on the work of insurance
historians, summarizes evolving practices in various life insurance markets in
32. See infra Part IV.
33. Recently, government policymakers have been considering the expanded use of commercial life
annuities to supplement social security and employer-provided retirement plans. See, e.g., Request for
Information Regarding Lifetime Income Options for Participants and Beneficiaries in Retirement Plans,
75 Fed. Reg. 5253 (Feb. 2, 2010).
34. See generally, e.g., IRVINE LOUDON, DEATH IN CHILDBIRTH: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF
MATERNAL CARE AND MATERNAL MORTALITY 1800-1950, at 25, 365-95 (1992) (summarizing problems
with measurement of mortality in the United States due to the incompleteness of pre-1933 vital statistics
of birth and death registration).
35. See, e.g., ALAIN DESROSIERES, THE POLITICS OF LARGE NUMBERS: A HISTORY OF
STATISTICAL REASONING 67-146 (1998); HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 226-37. As Drew Gilpin Faust has
pointed out, in the decades preceding the Civil War, Americans began to view numbers as a "tool of
mastery over both nature and society." DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH
AND THE CIVIL WAR 251 (2008).
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America from after the Civil War up to the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment. It shows, through comparison of risk classifications and the ways
insurance companies responded to mortality differentials within those
classifications, that the development of gender-distinct pricing cannot be
explained entirely through either economic rationality or the profit motive. It
then discusses how those practices mirrored and underscored important legal
and social changes after the Civil War. This Article ends with questions for
further investigation by looking forward to the second wave of women's rights
reforms in the modern Civil Rights Era.
I will assume for purposes of the following discussion that, despite
profound deficiencies in the mortality data available to American insurance
companies in the nineteenth century, insurers sincerely believed that mortality
rate differentials existed, to a greater or lesser extent, among groups classified
by race, sex, occupation, or geography. Researchers have long debated the
reason for these mortality differentials, and explanations for the use of these
categories, particularly of race and gender, have shifted as scientifically and
socially acceptable views concerning the use of those classifications have
changed over time. 37 Nevertheless, determining when greater precision in
enumeration was deemed appropriate and when imprecision was more readily
tolerated reveals inconsistencies that cannot be completely explained by
developments in actuarial practice. Instead, I argue that inconsistencies in
practice can be found along the fault lines created by shifts in the legal and
social foundation of gender relations during that time.
II. THE ANTEBELLUM ORIGINS OF GENDER-DISTINCT INSURANCE RATES, 1820-
1860
This Part provides historical background for my central argument,
introduced here and developed in the next Part, that life insurance companies
resolved the highly contested theoretical and practical conflict between equality
of contract for married women and the traditional dependencies of the home
through the selective adoption of gender-differentiated contract rates. The
discussion below sets the stage for that argument by describing the economic
impetus for the enactment of insurance-related exceptions to coverture, the role
played by the common law of coverture in enforcing the traditional dependency
relationships of the home, and the fundamental conflict with the status of
36. I leave to demographers and insurance historians a determination of whether nineteenth-century
insurance classifications represented an accurate generalization of statistical groupings. For the
argument that the anti-discrimination principle also operates to prohibit gender-based generalizations
that appear to rest on a sound statistical foundation, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES,
PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 151-54 (2003).
37. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A
Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505, 538-58 (1980).
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coverture created by the recognition of separate contract rights for married
women.
Next, this Part uses a case study to introduce the insurance pricing patterns
that became more established in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In
1845, a year after Massachusetts's enactment of insurance-related exceptions to
coverture, the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company (referred to
hereafter as "MHL") adopted gender-distinct mortality tables and rates for its
life annuity business. MHL's life annuity contracts were used primarily to fund
lifetime financial support for elderly dependents and to supplement or replace
women's marital rights of support or dower. MHL also retained gender-merged
tables and unisex rates for its life insurance business. At that time, MHL's life
insurance contracts were used primarily to protect wives and children from the
death of the family breadwinner-a more traditional pattern of dependency.
The newly adopted lifetime annuity pricing practices thus emphasized gender
difference in those contracts which posed the most threat to traditional marital
or family dependency relationships.
Finally, this Part describes the broader legal and social changes at issue
during the antebellum period that influenced those involved in developing these
insurance pricing practices. First-wave women's rights activism sharpened the
fundamental theoretical conflict at issue in the insurance context between
contract rights and dependency, and established the centrality of that conflict to
the wider struggles within abolitionism and the movement for women's rights.
These insurance pricing policies thus both reflected and reinforced the
dominant gender ideologies of the time.
A. Insurance-Related Exceptions to Coverture
During the antebellum period, life insurance became more viable as a form
of economic security for families following certain statutory changes to the law
of marital status. In the 1840s, during a period of financial stress for many
families, state legislatures began removing the legal obstacles to insurance
coverage posed by coverture. However, because these newly developed
statutory exceptions to the common law fiction of "marital unity" permitted
married women to enter into insurance contracts separate and apart from their
husbands, they also created a fundamental conflict with the legal status regime
of coverture. Under coverture, as described in greater detail below, husbands
served as legal representatives of their wives and "masters" of their households.
In the first half of the nineteenth century--during a period of rapid
industrialization, increased reliance on wage labor, and vulnerability to
financial crises -the restrictive legal environment for married women and the
38. See, e.g., ALBORN, supra note 12, at 4 (describing a similar growth of the life insurance
business in Great Britain); MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910, at 6-7
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relatively minor scale of the American life insurance business impeded
adequate economic security for American families.39 The early insurance-
related statutory changes, led by legislation adopted in New York4 o following
the financial panic of 1837 and a severe economic depression that began in
1839,41 removed legal obstacles posed by coverture to the successful
marketing42 of life insurance as a means of providing families with greater
economic security. 43
Although economic conditions provided the impetus for these insurance-
related statutory modifications to the law of marital status, woman's rights
activists in New York and other states soon demanded expanded property and
contract rights for married women. These insurance-related legislative
changes" thus marked an early step toward more comprehensive married
women's property acts45 that granted married women broader rights to own
property, and later to enter into contracts other than life insurance contracts.
Over time, the theoretical conflict between equality of contract for married
women and the status of coverture expanded into a broader range of issues both
at home and in the marketplace.
Coverture prevented married women from entering into insurance or other
contracts on their own behalf. Under coverture, as explained by Blackstone,
"the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband."46 The common law fiction of "marital unity"47 thus impaired a
(1963) (observing that American life insurance "emerged as a full-fledged enterprise" in the 1840s, and
connecting the growth of mutual insurance companies to the financial panic of 1837 and the ensuing
depression); JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF
AMERICA'S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 16-77 (2003) (examining early twentieth-century
changes in the mass marketing of private insurance); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC:
CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 5 (2004)
(comparing the Civil War's legacy of "questions about the meaning of free labor and about distinctions
between a free labor society and a slave society," with the late nineteenth century industrial accident
crisis, which "introduced to the American legal system new ideas and institutions organized around risk,
security, and the actuarial categories of insurance").
39. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 138-42.
40. 1840 N.Y. Laws 59.
41. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 127, 137.
42. See generally, e.g., VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 91-117 (1979) (describing changes in the
marketing of life insurance during the nineteenth century).
43. Basch, supra note 15, at 356; see also I R. CARLYLE BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE
CONVENTION, 1906-1952: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE 50 (1953).
44. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 142-5; see also Basch, supra note 15, at 349.
45. NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 137-200 (1982) (discussing enactment of New York's married
women's property law in 1848). Other states adopted married women's property acts both before and
after 1848. Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1397-
1412 (1983).
46. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, ABRIDGEMENT OF BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 75 (William C.
Sprague ed., 1895) (1892).
47. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 550-57 (3d ed. 1990).
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married woman's separate capacity to contract, to convey or devise property,
and to file suit.4 8 Under the law of agency, a wife might be permitted to enter
into certain types of contracts as her husband's agent.49 However, a married
woman in her own capacity could not purchase life insurance on her own or her
husband's life.
Under the common law, all of a married woman's personal property and
the management of her real property went to her husband.o Unless her family
could provide property in an equitable separate estate or trust, a woman
entered marriage as a dependent, without property or the legal right to earnings
through her own labor.52 Well-to-do families might reserve in a marriage
settlement a fixed sum to be administered by trustees during the marriage.
When invested in an annuity, such a sum generated a stream of income for life
or for a term of years, providing a source of income security for the wife during
and after the marriage.53 For many families of lesser wealth or those living in
states without courts of equity, however, such arrangements would have been
out of reach; instead, under coverture wives became economically and legally
dependent on their husbands. The husband in turn had the responsibility to
represent and support his wife.54 Although a husband could take out a life
insurance policy on his own life and designate his wife or children as the
beneficiaries, 5 the policy was considered part of the husband's estate and thus
could be reached by the husband's creditors.
Unmarried women, by contrast, were treated under the common law
category of feme sole rather thanfeme covert, and as such, were "unconstrained
by coverture's strictures" and inhabited a space largely "outside of the
48. BASCH, supra note 45, at 17; see also HARTOG, supra note 25, at 93-135.
49. JOAN R. GUNDERSON, TO BE USEFUL TO THE WORLD: WOMEN IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA,
1740-1790, at 87-88 (2d ed. 2006); Joanne Bailey, Favoured or Oppressed? Married Women, Property
and "Coverture"in England, 1660-1800, 17 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 351, 355-61 (2002).
50. Chused explains that "[w]here equity courts existed, separate equitable estates could be created
for married women's property, but the protections to be provided a wife by the equitable forum had to
be specifically delineated in the document creating the estate." Chused, supra note 45, at 1361.
51. See MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 83 (1986);
Chused, supra note 45, at 1361.
52. See, e.g., JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY
OF LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 142-63 (1990); Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's
Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-85 (1994).
53. In England, for example, although such arrangements were used more frequently by the
aristocracy, they began to be used as an alternative to life insurance by the propertied middle classes
beginning in the nineteenth century. See ALBORN, supra note 12, at 140.
54. HARTOG, supra note 25, at 136-66.
55. Legal constraints also generally prevented a husband from purchasing insurance on the life of
his wife or child. The legal or contractual requirement of an insurable interest necessitated adequate
evidence of a specific monetary interest in the insured. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 141. Affection alone,
evidenced by the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child, generally did not suffice. Some
financial interest such as an interest in services or property depending on the life of the wife or child was
required. See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 381, 407-09
(1918).
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regulatory framework of marriage law."56 They could enter into contracts, sue
and be sued, own property, and earn and keep their own income and the rents
from their real property. A married woman could be treated as a feme sole
under very limited circumstances: following an annulment or separation
agreement; abandonment by her husband; or in certain jurisdictions, with her
husband's consent, as a feme sole trader engaged in separate business
activities.57
Although widows assumed the status of feme sole upon the death of their
husbands, the law preserved the reach of coverture through dower, which
generally provided widows a life estate in the amount of one third of their
husbands' real property. Dower defined the widow as "less than a full
contractual agent" by restricting her ability "to contract, to own, manage and
dispose of property subject to dower . . . ."5 State statutory restrictions on
widows' common law dower share and the failure of husbands to provide for
their wives by will frequently left widows dependent on the good will of other
family members or on the charity of others.
The common law of coverture and dower thus enforced the economic
dependency of married women and of widows. However, at the same time, it
also posed an obstacle to the use of life insurance to protect widows and
children from destitution, particularly when creditors asserted claims over
amounts paid at the family breadwinner's death. During a time of financial
crisis and widespread business insolvencies in New York and other commercial
centers, providing targeted relief could remove the obstacle of coverture in that
limited context, assist private enterprise, and potentially relieve localities from
added burdens of poor relief.
The insurance-related exception to coverture enacted by the New York
State Legislature in 1840 allowed a married woman to contract for insurance on
her husband's life and protected insurance proceeds from her husband's
creditors.60 The New York law permitted a woman to enter into a contract of
insurance on the life of her husband "by herself and in her name, or in the name
of any third person, with his assent, as her trustee." It also provided that
insurance, up to a capped amount, would be "free from the claims of the
representatives of her husband, or of any of his creditors." 62 In the event of the
56. Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the
Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1655 (2003).
57. SALMON, supra note 51, at 44-53, 58-59.
58. Felice Batlan, Engendering Legal History, 30 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 823, 833 (2005).
59. SALMON, supra note 51, at 141-84; see also HOFF, supra note 25, at 82-90; HORWITZ, supra
note 17, at 56-58 (discussing judicial decisions undermining the right of dower).
60. An Act in respect to insurances for lives for the benefit of married women, 1840 N.Y. Laws 59;
ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 1800-1861, at
221 (1987).
61. 1840N.Y.Laws59at§l.
62. Id. This exemption only applied, however, to policies with an annual premium of less than three
hundred dollars. In 1858, the statute was amended to provide that "such exemption shall not apply where
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wife dying before her husband, the policy reverted to the children.63 The New
York approach, enacted in acknowledgement of the financial plight and
dependence of widows and orphans in an increasingly complex and unstable
economy, was actively supported by the life insurance industry6 and proved
influential in other states.
Massachusetts enacted a similar statute in 1844, which applied to any
policy "on the life of any person" for the "benefit of a married woman,"
whether "effected by herself or her husband, or by any other person on her
behalf," and provided that it "shall enure to her separate use and benefit and
that of her children, if any, independently of her husband and of his creditors
and representatives, and also independently of any other person effecting the
same in her behalf, his creditors and representatives."65 The Massachusetts
statute thus differed from New York's law by providing explicit protection
from husbands' claims as well as uncapped protection from the claims of
creditors. The Massachusetts version was drafted by the founding president of
the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, according to a company
history, after he received an inquiry from one of the company's directors about
the status of policies on the lives of his daughters if any of them were to
66
marry. A New England Mutual solicitation pamphlet, published in 1844,
included a copy of the newly enacted law as well as copies of the company's
charter, by-laws, and a detailed explanation of the principles and practices of a
mutual company. Other states followed with similar insurance-related statutes
during the next several decades. 6 8
the amount of premium annually paid out of the funds and property of the husband shall exceed three
hundred dollars." 1858 N.Y. Laws 81 at §1 (emphasis added).
63. 1840 N.Y. Laws ch. 80, N.Y. Sess. Laws 59 at §2.
64. BASCH, supra note 45, at 137 (noting that business journals greeted the insurance legislation
"with enthusiasm and found no threat in it to the institution of marriage."); MURPHY, supra note 12, at
138 (observing that the New York Life Insurance and Trust Company, the largest life underwriter in
1840, "spearheaded" the legislative campaign). Within weeks after the enactment of the New York law
in April 1840, a pattern of wives being listed as applicants for life insurance on the lives of their
husbands began to appear in company records. See New York Life Insurance and Trust Company
Collection, Series EB-1, Register of Life Insurance, 1830-1878, (policy nos. 1811, 1931, 1957, 2227,
2298), Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School.
65. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 82, § 1 (1844). However, the statute provided some limited protections
for creditors in cases where policy premiums were paid "by any person, with intent to defraud his
creditors." Id. at § 3. In subsequent years, the statute was modified to alter the scope of that protection.
MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 58, § 62 (1860); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 197 (1864).
66. ABRAM T. COLLIER, A CAPITAL SHIP: NEW ENGLAND LIFE, A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST
CHARTERED MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1835-1985, at 38 (1985).
67. Id. at 33.
68. See MURPHY, supra note 12, at 145 (recounting the adoption of such statutes by Maryland in
1841, Massachusetts in 1844, Tennessee in 1846, and New Jersey in 1851); see also, e.g., 1895 Minn.
Laws 429; 1850 N.H. Laws 950; 1868 Pa. Laws 136; 1851 Wis. Sess. Laws 136. In those states without
a statute, new companies sometimes had the provisions incorporated into their charter, and such
provisions were upheld by state courts. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 145 (listing examples from 1846
through 1868).
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After the adoption of insurance-related exceptions to coverture and other
statutory changes aimed at protecting widows and children from creditors, 69a
broader movement toward married women's property rights developed, with
the support of woman's rights activists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton.70 That
activism led to the adoption in New York, for example, of the Married
71 72Women's Property Acts of 18487 and 1860. The enactments in New York
and other states, despite narrowing interpretations by the courts,n gradually led
to an expansion of married women's separate contract and property rights
during the latter half of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century.74
Along with other factors, including increased marketing efforts by newly
formed mutual life insurance companies,75 these legal reforms facilitated the
76
dramatic growth of the life insurance business over the next several decades.
The growth of mutual life insurance companies provided middle class men with
greater access to financial security for their surviving dependents in the event
of their death. The New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, in its second
annual report of 1845, observed:
A very considerable number of the policies are for security to
creditors; some to protect the insured against the loss of an interest in
property depending upon a life; but much the greatest number to make
provision for the families of the parties insured, or persons dependent,
or having strong claims upon them. 77
The report then explained the benefits of policies for the whole life of the
insured, rather than policies for a term of years, for family provision.n
69. Chused, supra note 50, at 1361 (describing some of these statutory changes).
70. BASCH, supra note 45, at 167-72.
71. 1848 N.Y. Laws 307.
72. 1860 N.Y. Laws 90.
73. Siegel, supra note 25, at 2131, 2141 (describing the restrictive judicial interpretation of married
women's "earnings statutes," which permitted married women "to assert property rights in their labor
and granted wives various forms of legal agency respecting their separate property, including the
capacity to contract and file suit").
74. See Chused, supra note 50, at 1384, 1398 (discussing nineteenth-century expansions of married
women's contract and property rights).
75. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 147-48 (describing marketing efforts and increased policies taken
out by wives on the lives of their husbands).
76. See id at 5; see also KELLER, supra note 38, at 6-7.
77. Second Report of the Directors at the Annual Meeting of the Members, Dec. 1, 1845, at 7-10, in
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE NEW ENGLAND MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON, 1844-1862
(1863). The company reported that the largest number of life insurance policies issued since its founding
was to merchants, traders, brokers, mechanics, and tradesmen. It had also issued policies to clerks,
cashiers, students, lawyers, teachers, manufacturers, farmers, clergymen, physicians, and some
"females." Id.
78. Id. at 11.
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In an advertising campaign in 1855, the Mutual Life Insurance Company of
New York-a future industry giant-directed an appeal specifically toward
women in its Consideration on Life Insurance by a Lady:
It is the wife, the mother, the daughter, and the sister, who need to be
protected when their natural protector is taken away. It is to these Life
Insurance makes its appeal; and for these may not man be taught to
practise prudence, sobriety, and economy, and become the possessor of
a life policy?79
At the same time, The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York
advertised its life insurance products to married men, as follows in The
Advantage ofLife Insurance: "The pangs of separation are greatly increased by
the bitter reflection, that a beloved wife or children are about to lose their
natural protector and friend, and be left, often worse than penniless, to the cold
charities of the world.',80 The early modification of marital status law thus
facilitated financial protection for families in an economy increasingly
dependent upon wage labor, but it also created a fundamental theoretical
tension with the common law status of coverture by recognizing married
women's separate capacity to enter into life insurance contracts.
B. From Gender-Merged to Gender-Distinct Rates for Life Annuities
Shortly after the adoption of insurance-related exceptions to coverture,
American life insurance companies began to adopt gender-distinct rates or
benefits for life annuities. Before that time, insurance companies used gender-
merged mortality tables and unisex pricing for both annuities and life
insurance. ' Uncovering how and why that shift occurred reveals a confluence
of legal, financial, social, and political factors that contributed to the adoption
of gender-distinct rates or benefits for life annuities. The statutory innovations
discussed in the previous section set the stage for married women to contract
for insurance in their own capacity without the need for special trust
arrangements or the establishment of equitable separate estates. The financial
issues discussed in this section created a pressing need for upward adjustments
in life annuity rates. The adoption of higher gender-distinct rates met that need
and, as discussed in the next section, also responded to legal, social, and
political developments that were increasingly emphasizing differences between
79. SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF THE
MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK 1843-1943, at 94 (1946).
80. Id.
81. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 14-42 (describing the mortality tables in use and the pricing
practices of the major American life insurance companies operating during the years before the Civil
War).
350 [Vol. 23:2
2011] From Coverture to Contract: Engendering Insurance on Lives
men and women. This shift in underlying assumptions about gender difference
can also be found in changes in the actuarial explanations for the use of gender-
merged and gender-distinct mortality tables.
Gender-merged mortality tables were utilized in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries because of limitations in the available data as well as
the judgment by a leading eighteenth century British actuarial expert, Dr.
Richard Price, that mortality differences were based, at least in part, on
geographic or environmental factors, and thus were not entirely "natural." 82
After noting greater mortality among men and women in cities than among
those in the countryside, for example, Price constructed a gender-merged, or
combined, table from detailed gender-differentiated Swedish data to "exhibit
more accurately than any other, the probabilities of living among the general
mass of mankind, consisting of males and females taken collectively."83 The
mortality table Price constructed from more limited British data, the
Northampton table, was also gender-merged. 84
Price's Northampton table was widely used in Great Britain until well into
the nineteenth century,85 and was also influential in the United States. For
example, the first commercial life insurance company established in America,
chartered in 1812, based its early rates on the gender-merged Northampton
86table. That company, the Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and
Granting Annuities, issued both life insurance and annuities87 and charged
equal premiums for male and female covered lives of equal ages.8 As
discussed below, the Northampton table was also adopted by an early
commercial life insurance business established in New England, the
82. RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON REVERSIONARY PAYMENTS 140 (1783), reprinted in 2
HISTORY OF ACTUARIAL SCIENCE, supra note 12, at 39, 66 (commenting on Swedish national mortality
data, which unlike some of the mortality data compiled in Great Britain, contained gender- and age-
differentiated mortality rates).
83. Id. at 59-60 (explaining his method of combining male and female experience); see also I
HISTORY OF ACTUARIAL SCIENCE, supra note 12, at 40 (noting, in comments of editors, that although
Price's method of combining male and female experience was "not entirely sound," Price's Swedish
table was "well-received" and used into the early nineteenth century).
84. See infra note 116 (discussing the construction of Price's Northampton table).
85. See ALBORN, supra note 12, at 107 (noting that the proportion of British life insurance offices
using Price's Northampton table "diminished from roughly half in 1826 to under 20 per cent fifteen
years later").
86. 1 R. CARLYLE BULEY, THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES,
1893-1968, at 31; see also MURPHY, supra note 12, at 17 (noting that the Pennsylvania Company for
Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities constructed tables in 1814 based on American mortality
records compiled by the Episcopal Church and the Philadelphia Board of Health but that it never
adopted either of those tables and instead used the British Northampton tables to price its products).
87. BULEY, supra note 86.
88. See, e.g., HARRISON S. MORRIS, A SKETCH OF THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY FOR INSURANCES
ON LIVES AND GRANTING ANNUITIES 101-02, 106, 113, 121-28 (1896) (including life insurance and
annuity premium rate tables, referred to in a document dated 1814); 1. OWEN STALSON, MARKETING
LIFE INSURANCE: ITS HISTORY IN AMERICA 56, 58-59 (1942) (noting that in 1814, the company had
thirty life insurance and annuity policies in force, of which ten covered women and three covered female
children).
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Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company. This company, which later
became one of the first American companies to adopt gender-distinct mortality
tables and rates for life annuities, was chartered in 1818 under a profit-sharing
arrangement with Massachusetts General Hospital, and began operations in
1823.89
MHL developed into one of the largest financial institutions in Boston in
the nineteenth century, primarily through its trust deposits, and served as an
important source of funds for New England's industrial growth.90 Although the
life insurance and life annuity division of the company remained relatively
small in comparison to its trust business,91 the primary concern of the company
as a whole was with the economic protection of dependent members of society,
including women, children, and the elderly.92
MHL's life annuity contract, for example, permitted "[a]n aged person
whose income is not sufficient for his maintenance" to "exchange his capital
for a life annuity, and thus provide for an expenditure, much exceeding the
simple interest of his money, without fear of being reduced to poverty if he
should live to an extreme old age."9 It was designed so that a "large interest is
allowed during the life of the party, and at his death the capital becomes the
property of the Company." 94 The contracts could be written with an
inalienability clause protecting the individual in any payments received under a
contract from the claims of creditors. With a life annuity, the company also
explained, "a wife can obtain an equivalent for the surrender of her right of
dower, or the assignees of a bankrupt's estate can extinguish a claim for
dower."95 By contrast, the company explained, life insurance permits a "young
man of small property, by an annual appropriation of a part of the proceeds of
his labour" to make insurance on his own life, and thus "secure to his family or
friends the payment of a large sum in case of his death." 96
For the life insurance and life annuity branch of the company's business,
MHL's first actuary, Nathaniel Bowditch, took as his guide on actuarial
matters the experience of the Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives
89. GERALD T. WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HOSPITAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
9, 19 (1955).
90. Id. at xiii (introductory comments by Henrietta M. Larson and Thomas R. Navin, editors of
Harvard Studies in Business History).
91. Id. at 192-94.
92. Id. at 28.
93. PROPOSALS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HOSPITAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY TO MAKE
INSURANCE ON LIVES, To GRANT ANNUITIES ON LIVES AND IN TRUST, AND ENDOWMENTS FOR
CHILDREN, AUGUST 18, 1823 (under "Object of the Society"), Massachusetts Hospital Life Collection.
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School.
94. Id. (under "Annuities").
95. Id. (under "Object of the Society").
96. Id.
97. See RONALD STORY, THE FORGING OF AN ARISTOCRACY, HARVARD AND THE BOSTON UPPER
CLASS, 1800-1870, at 45-47 (1980) (discussing Bowditch's background and experience); WHITE, supra
note 89, at 63 (noting that Bowditch served as MHL's actuary until his death in 1838).
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and Granting Annuities (referred to hereafter as "The Pennsylvania
Company").98 Accordingly, Bowditch used Price's Northampton gender-
merged mortality table in setting rates for both life insurance and life annuities.
From the beginning, however, MHL's overall rates on life annuities were
somewhat higher than those of The Pennsylvania Company although its life
insurance rates were initially identical. 99 In 1829, Bowditch sent The
Pennsylvania Company a copy of MHL's book of rates,too reported that a
committee had been formed to study the need for increased rates for annuities,
and outlined a list of proposed revised rates which were not differentiated by
gender.'o0
During the following decade, the influence of the gender-merged Carlisle
table gradually superseded that of the Northampton table among American
insurance companies. The Carlisle table, constructed in 1815 by Joshua Milne,
was based on records from the English town of Carlisle from 1779 to 1787 that
did not distinguish between sexes within its age distribution.102 Significantly,
however, the life expectancies of the Carlisle table were much longer than
those of the Northampton table, prompting life insurance companies like the
New York Life Insurance and Trust Company,103 and later The Pennsylvania
Company,104 to offer lower, more competitive rates for life insurance. 0 5
MHL, however, was much slower to act. Since life expectancies were
longer under the Carlisle table compared to those under the Northampton table,
retaining the outdated Northampton table without adjusting other assumptions
98. WHITE, supra note 89, at 29 nn.26-27.
99. Id. at 31.
100. Letter from N. Bowditch to T. Smiley, dated March 2, 1829, Massachusetts Hospital Life
Insurance Company Collection, Case LA-1, at 186, outgoing letters copied into volumes, 1823-1834.
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School. Bowditch noted that "[w]e . . . have
always supposed we granted the annuities at too low a rate, and I have so reported at our successive
annual meetings. . .
101. Id.
102. Thus, it was not possible for Milne to use the data to determine death rates for the sexes
separately, but only in combination with each other in a gender-merged mortality table. JOSHUA MILNE,
A TREATISE ON THE VALUATION OF ANNUITIES AND ASSURANCES (1815), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF
ACTUARIAL SCIENCE, supra note 12, at 79, 98. Milne pointed out that this was "the less to be regretted,
as the numbers, when kept distinct for each sex, would have been so small." Id. at 98.
103. New York Life and Trust, which began business in the 1830s, adopted the Carlisle table in
1832, with thirty-five percent added for the "loading" of expenses, profits, and contingencies, allowing it
to undercut The Pennsylvania Company at that time by as much as twenty percent. MURPHY, supra note
12, at 20 & 303 tbl. A.2 (comparing the life expectancies of various tables).
104. 1 BULEY, supra note 86, at 33; see also J.A. FOWLER, HISTORY OF INSURANCE IN
PHILADELPHIA FOR Two CENTURIES (1683-1882), at 654, 656 (1888).
105. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 17-22; see also W.A. Armstrong, The Trend of Mortality in
Carlisle Between the 1780s and the 1840s: A Demographic Contribution to the Standard of Living
Debate, 34 ECON. HIST. REv. 94, 99 (1981) (stating that the Carlisle table, which replaced the less
reliable Northampton table, remained widely used by insurance societies until the 1870s).
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used to compute its rates might increase its life insurance profits but also result
in greater losses in its annuity business.106
In the 1840s, new, more sales-oriented mutual companiesio7-such as the
New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, 0 8 whose directors overlapped
with MHL's board of directors,109-began marketing life insurance more
aggressively than the relatively staid companies that relied primarily on their
general trust business. In this more competitive environment for life insurance,
and at about the time New England Mutual was seeking an insurance-related
statutory exception to coverture in Massachusetts, MHL sought additional
outside advice on modifying its rates. That advice, as discussed in some detail
below, led to the adoption of higher gender-distinct rates for its life annuity
business and lower, gender-merged rates for its life insurance business.
In 1844, MHL commissioned Elizur Wright, a Yale graduate and former
mathematics professor at Western Reserve College in Ohio, to gather
information on English actuarial practices." 0 Wright, an impassioned
abolitionist who served as secretary of the American Anti-Slavery Society and
manager of its New York headquarters in the 1830s, had recently left the
employ of abolitionist organizations to pursue other writing and business
projects after breaking with various factions within the movement. Wright's
views are discussed in greater detail in the next section of the article,"' but his
own summary of his situation suffices for now. Looking back at that time some
years later, Wright wrote that having lost "popularity" and "consideration" in
the Anti-Slavery Society, "I . . . was left in fact to cut my own fodder in my
own way, looked upon by ecclesiastical people as an infidel, by political people
as an ultra, and by the abolitionists, so called, as a renegade."ll 2
MHL requested that Wright, while in Great Britain on other business, meet
with Joshua Milne-the creator of the Carlisle Table-and others, in an effort
to establish a more satisfactory rate structure for the company's life insurance
106. WHITE, supra note 89, at 31 (noting that during MHL's first fifteen years of operations, its
losses in its annuity business were more than offset by its total profit during that time in its life insurance
business).
107. KELLER, supra note 20, at 6-7.
108. wHITE, supra note 89, at 82. See also COLLIER, supra note 66, at 7, 19-21.
109. WHITE, supra note 89, at 84, 66 (noting that five of the eleven directors of the New England
Mutual Life Insurance Company were also employees or directors of the Massachusetts Hospital Life
Insurance Company during the mid-I 840s, including Francis C. Lowell who served as actuary of MHL
from 1845 to 1854, following the resignation of Joseph Tilden in February 1845). See also COLLIER,
supra note 66, at 21, 44.
110. WHITE, supra note 89, at 83; see also LAWRENCE B. GOODHEART, ABOLITIONIST, ACTUARY,
ATHEIST: ELIZUR WRIGHT AND THE REFORM IMPULSE 16-23,34 (1990).
111. See infra Part II.C.
112. GOODHEART, supra note 110, at 113-14, 114 n.32 (quoting from Wright's autobiographical
defense of his role in the state regulation ofinsurance in A Curiosity of Law at 16, published in 1866).
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and annuity businesses.' 13 In addition to Milne, Wright met with the actuary of
the National Debt of Great Britain, John Finlaison.1 4 The British government's
National Debt Office had "adopted the Northampton tables in 1808 . . . as the
basis for the sale of [British government] life annuities" to redeem the public
debt." 5 The British government, like MHL, had continued to use that table
despite the availability of the Carlisle table during the next decade and despite
growing evidence of problems with the Northampton table, including revenue
losses on the sale of annuities.'' 6
In the late 1820s, after compiling extensive information on the mortality
experience of government annuitants, Finlaison advised Parliament that
significant losses were being sustained each week on the sale of life annuities
calculated on the basis of the outdated and flawed Northampton table." 7
Finlaison's study showed that average life expectancy had increased over the
previous century." 8 In addition, Finlaison observed that "except under the age
of 12 and above the age of 85 . . . there is at every other period of life a
remarkable and decided advantage in favour of the female." 19 He noted that
the rate of mortality had declined "on each sex equally, but not by equal
gradations, nor equally at all periods of life." 20 He observed that for males, the
rate of mortality "seems in early and middling life to have remained for a long
113. Id. at 144. MHL's annuity business at that time was "subject to violent fluctuations in profit
and loss, owing to the small number of annuitants." WHITE, supra note 89, at 85; see also WHITE, supra
note 89, at 31.
114. Id. at 85. Finlaison, who had earlier established Admiralty pension funds for widows and
orphans of the British navy, was appointed Actuary of the National Debt Office, a position created in
1821. DENNETT, supra note 12, at 4. Finlaison later served as the first President of the Institute of
Actuaries of Great Britain and Ireland. Id.
115. DENNETT, supra note 12, at 2-3 (describing the recommendation by William Morgan, Richard
Price's nephew who served as actuary for the Society for Equitable Assurance of Lives and
Survivorships from 1774 to 1830, that the National Debt Office adopt Price's Northampton tables for its
life annuities); see also MAURICE EDWARD OGBORN, EQUITABLE ASSURANCES: THE STORY OF LIFE
ASSURANCE IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE SOCIETY, 1762-1962, at 107-10
(1962).
116. The data used in the Northampton Table came from death records for a parish in Northampton,
England, gathered between 1735 and 1780. At the time Dr. Price constructed the table, he had been
under the "misapprehension that the population of this parish was stationary, judging by the number of
infantile baptisms," but at the time the data had been recorded, "there were a large number of Baptists in
Northampton, who repudiated infantile baptism." B. Benjamin et al., Actuarial Methods of Mortality
Analysis; Adaptation to Changes in the Age and Cause Pattern, 159 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON,
SERIES B, BIOLOGICAL Scis. 38, 38-39 (1963). Because of this underestimation of life expectancy based
on ratios of the dead to the living, the government charged lower than necessary premiums for payments
made over lives, and the government steadily lost money over time. OGBORN, supra note 115, at 197,
199. On the other hand, use of the Northampton Table resulted in large profits by companies engaged in
selling life insurance policies. See 2 J.L. ANDERSON & J.B. Dow, ACTUARIAL STATISTICS,
CONSTRUCTION OF MORTALITY AND OTHER TABLES 158-59 (1952).
117. JOHN FINLAISON, LIFE ANNUITIES-REPORT OF JOHN FINLAISON, ACTUARY OF THE
NATIONAL DEBT, ON THE EVIDENCE AND ELEMENTARY FACTS ON WHICH THE TABLES OF LIFE
ANNUITIES ARE FOUNDED (HOUSE OF COMMONS 1829), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF ACTUARIAL
SCIENCE, supra note 12, at 219-85.
118. Id.at232.
119. Id. at 234.
120. Id. at 232.
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time as it stood about fifty years ago," but that for females "it has, during the
same time, visibly and progressively diminished to this day, by slight but still
sensible gradations."l21 Finlaison also noted that the "gradual diminution of
mortality in maturer life, in middle and old age especially, presents one
practical consequence of the greatest importance in financial calculations."122
To stem the government's revenue losses from the flawed projections of the
Northampton table and from generally improved mortality,123 Finlaison
recommended that life annuity premium rates be adjusted upward.
Finlaison constructed separate male and female mortality tables and
recommended gender-distinct rates, with higher rates for female annuitants.124
In 1829, the British government adopted Finlaison's recommendations, and for
the first time, adopted higher premium charges for women than men in the sale
of government annuities. 12 5 Finlaison's tables provided the basis for pricing of
government life annuities for the next half-century; in addition, they influenced
the establishment of separate mortality tables for male and female annuitants in
the commercial setting.126
After Wright met with Finlaison, he proposed to MHL's Finance
Committee-then chaired by Francis C. Lowell, an MHL director and its newly
appointed actuary-that MHL use separate male and female mortality tables in
place of its former single merged table. In November 1845, on the report and
recommendation of the Finance Committee, MHL adopted separate male and
female mortality tables in place of its former single merged table at a time
when the granting of annuities on lives was a relatively small part of its overall
business.127 Both before and after the change in practice, a majority of MHL's
life annuitants were female and their average age was over sixty-five, with few
annuitants below the age of fifty.128 As noted by the company's actuary in early
1845, most of MHL's deposits had gone through probate or were "the earnings
of persons unused to making investments for future support."l29 After its
adoption of separate tables, MHL distinguished between male and female life
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. In his concluding observations, Finlaison raised the important question of how mortality rates
might be affected by the selection bias in favor of healthy applicants among purchasers of annuities.
Finlaison determined that this could not be resolved without further inquiry. Id. at 235.
124. Id. at 219-85.
125. Id. at 217 (the editors observing that these tables were the "basis for the grant of Government
life annuities until 1884," and that from "this time on, the necessity of using separate mortality tables for
male and female annuitants was established").
126. 2 HISTORY OF ACTUARIAL SCIENCE, supra note 12, at 219 (comments of editors Steven
Haberman and Trevor A. Sibbett).
127. WHITE, supra note 89, at 84.
128. Id. at 31, 84-85. As recounted by White, "[b]y the end of 1840 a total of 91 annuities had been
issued, of which about 60 were then in force." Id. at 31.
129. Letter from Joseph Tilden, Feb. 19, 1845, at 2 (Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance
Company Collection, AA-1, Case 1, Minutes of the Board of Directors, Feb. 22, 1845. Baker Library
Historical Collections, Harvard Business School).
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annuitants of the same age, and charged higher rates for coverage of women.
The Finance Committee's report to MHL's Board of Directors noted that the
proposed tables were based on experience in Europe, as well as on the
company's own, so that MHL had the means to make the tables "much more
equitable and reliable" than those made previously.130 The Committee proposed
these changes "not only for the public & our own convenience, but also for the
sake of sustaining the reputation of the Company."' 3 '
At the same time, the Finance Committee also recommended updated rates
for life insurance, a business declining due to competition from mutual
companies. It proposed an age-differentiated and gender-merged table based on
the combined mortality experience of seventeen British life insurance offices,
which would result in lower, but still gender-neutral, rates for life insurance
coverage.132
A similar pattern of gender distinctions in life annuities but unisex rates for
life insurance can be found in the pricing practices of another company at about
that time. A few years after the adoption of gender distinct annuity rates by
MHL, a company incorporated in Pennsylvania in 1848 known as the Equitable
Life Insurance, Annuity and Trust Company (hereinafter referred to as
Equitable) introduced gender-distinct benefits (rather than rates) for its newly
established life annuity business.' 3 3 The company's first actuary, H.G. Tuckett,
formerly of Great Britain and trained in mathematics as part of his British
military education, also introduced significantly lower life insurance rates than
those charged by other companies. 34 For its life annuity business, Equitable
utilized gender-distinct mortality tables similar to Finlaison's gender-distinct
130. Id.
13 1. Report of Francis C. Lowell, Chairman of the Committee of Finance, Massachusetts Hospital
Life Insurance Company, Nov. 5, 1845, at I (Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company
Collection, AA- 1, Case 1, Minutes of the Board of Directors, Feb. 19, 1845. Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School).
132. Id. at 1-2, 4 (appending rates for insuring lives "based upon the experience of Seventeen of the
oldest and largest Life insurance Companies in England" and noting that the business of insurance on
lives "has become almost nothing since the establishment of the New England Mutual" and thus "not
likely to be very considerable for the future. . . ."). As noted by a mid-twentieth-century treatise on life
insurance, the Seventeen Offices Table or Actuaries' Table, which preceded the American Experience
Table, was introduced into the United States by Elizur Wright as the standard for the valuation of
policies in Massachusetts. S. S. HUEBNER & KENNETH BLACK, JR., LIFE INSURANCE 189 (4th ed. 1950).
133. J.A. FOWLER, HISTORY OF INSURANCE IN PHILADELPHIA FOR TWO CENTURIES (1683-1882), at
670 (1888) (referring to discrimination between male and female life duration in life annuity benefits as
"sex discrimination"). Fowler later states that this was "the first discrimination of the kind introduced
into the United States," indicating either that he is unaware of the earlier use of such distinctions in life
annuity rates by the MHL or that he is drawing a distinction between the use of gender distinct rates and
benefits. Id. At the time of the adoption of gender-distinct annuity benefits by Equitable, Pennsylvania
had no statutory provisions permitting married women to enter into insurance contracts. However, as
Fowler points out, Equitable's corporate charter, sanctioned by the state, provided that married women
could insure the lives of their husbands free of the claims of representatives or creditors of their
husbands. Id. at 666. Pennsylvania provided similar protections by statute some years later. See supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
134. FOWLER, supra note 133, at 666.
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tables. Under those mortality assumptions, Equitable provided greater benefits
per hundred dollars paid to the company for male lives than for female lives. Its
annuity benefits were higher for men than those of the older Pennsylvania
Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting of Annuities,'35 and were lower
for women than those of The Pennsylvania Company. However, the "mean of
the two sex age-annuities was lower" than that of the original gender-merged
annuity of The Pennsylvania Company, reflecting the longer average life
expectancies shown in Finlaison's tables.136 Nevertheless, like MHL, Equitable
priced its life insurance without gender distinctions in rates or benefits.' 37
For the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, which had insured
Wright's life before he embarked on his voyage to Great Britain,138 Wright
advised a quite different innovation for risk classification in life insurance-
one based on behavior rather than gender. Wright persuaded the company to
experiment with temperance life insurance rates. He believed that strong drink
and poverty were closely connected and that the two combined produced
crime.' 39 Wright was convinced that those who totally abstained from alcohol
were preferred risks and had been favorably impressed by a temperance life
insurance company in Great Britain.140 On his return, Wright persuaded the
officers of New England Mutual Life to put abstainers in a special risk
classification, and to sell them "temperance" life insurance at preferred rates.141
Under a contract entered into with the company in 1845, as noted later by two
of his adult grandchildren, Wright received a commission on the first premium
of all temperance life insurance policies.142
As editor of The Chronotype, Wright reported on and actively promoted
temperance life insurance.143 He also advocated more generally for temperance
and a regimen of frequent physical exercise, modest meals, and at least one
cold bath a day.144 Despite Wright's efforts, the company did not receive
135. Id. at 670. For discussion of The Pennsylvania Company, see supra text accompanying notes
86-88. Tuckett served as actuary for Equitable until a change in management in 1849, and then for a
short time served as Philadelphia agent for the Eagle Life and Health Insurance Company of New
Jersey. Id. at 678, 685.
136. Id. at 670.
137. Id. at 667-69.
138. WHITE, supra note 89, at 83.
139. PHILLIP GREEN WRIGHT & ELIZABETH Q. WRIGHT, ELIZUR WRIGHT: THE FATHER OF LIFE
INSURANCE 156, 164 (1937).
140. GOODHEART, supra note 112, at 144-45 (not naming the company). See also ALBORN, supra
note 12, at 39-40 (observing that the United Kingdom Temperance & General, formed in 1840, initially
restricted to strict abstainers, opened a general section in 1847 and paid separate bonuses to each section
with higher bonuses to non-drinkers, "which built a loyal following among the largely lower-middle-
class customer base that turned temperance into a national campaign by the 1870s").
141. COLLIER, supra note 66, at 44.
142. WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 139, at 228-29 (citing a contract made with the company
August 12, 1845).
143. See, e.g., WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 139, at 228 n.7; Elizur Wright, Temperance Life
Insurance, THE CHRONOTYPE, Sept. 19, 1846, at 2.
144. GOODHEART, supra note 112, at 145.
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enough applications for insurance with a total-abstinence condition to make the
plan a success.145
In sum, Wright's actuarial investigations in Great Britain resulted in
American companies adopting two new risk classifications-a gender-based
risk classification for life annuities, and a behavioral classification for life
insurance. The gender-based classification became established in general
commercial practice for the sale of annuities by the end of the nineteenth
century;146 Wright's recommendation for adoption of a behavior-based risk
classification for life insurance purchased by nondrinkers did not take hold,
however, although a parallel could be found today in favorable life insurance
rates for nonsmokers.
A focus on the mortality classification of gender in one line of business but
on behavioral factors in the other may have reflected the background
assumption, different from that of Dr. Price when he constructed the gender-
merged Swedish and Northampton tables, that mortality differentials between
men and women primarily reflected "natural" difference rather than
environmental or geographical factors such as occupational hazards or living
conditions, or behavioral influences such as engaging in dangerous activities or
consuming alcohol or tobacco products. In addition, generalized improvements
in mortality for both men and women during the nineteenth century contributed
to unsustainable cost pressures in the lifetime annuity line of business, while at
the same time leading to increased potential for profitability in the life
insurance business.
The financial pressure on the life annuity business would have been
intensified by the relatively small number of annuitants and the greater
percentage of women covered by those products as compared to life insurance.
This pattern of coverage paralleled the differing legal and economic status of
men and women, with women more heavily represented as insured lives in
annuities aimed either at providing women with marriage settlements in trust or
at providing widows with annual financial support during their remaining
years. Married men, by contrast, were much more heavily represented as
insured lives in products aimed at protecting their families against the loss of
support represented by an untimely death.
Nevertheless, the resolution of the financial issues caused by the continued
use of the outdated and flawed Northampton table to price life annuities could
have been achieved through lowered interest rate assumptions, the use of an
updated gender-merged table reflecting improvements in mortality for both
men and women, or a combination of the two. Antebellum companies
essentially took such an approach when they adopted updated gender-merged
tables to offer lower, more competitive rates in their life insurance business. As
145. WRIGHT& WRIGHT, supra note 139, at 229; see GOODHEART, supra note 112, at 145.
146. See infra Part Ill.C.
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argued in the next section, the gender-distinct tables and rates developed in
Great Britain for life annuities and exported to America during the antebellum
period reflected views about differences between men and women that were
increasingly prominent in both Great Britain and in America during that time.
Those views developed amid industrialization, the demise of slavery, and the
legal transitions that accompanied them.
C. "First Wave" Activism and the Dependencies of the Home
The conflict created in the insurance context between contract rights for
married women and the traditional dependencies of the home echoed a much
broader legal and political struggle. In both Great Britain and the United States
during that time, increased attention was being paid to the social and political
significance of differences between men and women. At the same time that
industrialization was transforming nineteenth-century ways of life, powerful
economic, political, and social forces reinforced the idea of "separate spheres"
for men and women.147
In both countries, gender ideology had long been influenced by religious
thought about the natures and roles of women and men. Under those views,
women played a divinely determined subordinate role as a helpmate to men,
and in marriage, husband and wife became "one flesh,"148 a concept related to
the fiction of "marital unity" under the common law status of coverture. More
radical religious traditions and Enlightenment-inspired ideas countered those
views of gender difference. Influenced by the French Revolution, English
radicalism, and the dissenting views of influential figures like Dr. Richard
Price, later writers such as Mary Wollstonecraftl 49 sought to determine, on the
basis of observation and critical thinking rather than scripture, which sexual
differences were innate and which were a product of society.150 By 1850, most
of the ideas used to define women as innately different from, and inferior to,
men had been challenged in both Europe and America.152
147. See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW
ENGLAND 1780-1835, at 197-206 (1977); LEONORE DAVIDOFF & CATHERINE HALL, FAMILY
FORTUNES: MEN AND WOMEN OF THE ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS 1780-1850, at xiii-xviii (rev. ed. 2002);
ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, GENDER IN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1650-1850: THE EMERGENCE OF SEPARATE
SPHERES? 305-18 (1998); see also Siegel, supra note 25, at 2139-41.
148. The term "one flesh" was originally biblical, Genesis 2:24 (King James); see Basch, supra
note 15, at 346, 356.
149. CLAIRE TOMALIN, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT 31, 97 (1974).
150. Id. at 42-43 (describing Price's dissenting views and their influence on Wollstonecraft); see
also Letter from Lucretia Mott to Elizabeth Cady Stanton (March 16, 1855), in SELECTED LETTERS OF
LUCRETIA COFFIN MOTT 234 (Beverly Wilson Palmer ed., 2002) (urging Stanton to give credit in an
upcoming book to Wollstonecraft for her "radical claim" of the rights of woman); Letter from Lucretia
Mott to Elizabeth Neall Gay, Montgomery County, Pennsylvnia (May 7, 1858), in SELECTED LETTERS,
supra, at 272 (referring to Vindication of the Rights of Women as having been for twenty years "my pet
book").
151. See, e.g., SHOEMAKER, supra note 147, at 15-58.
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During the years leading up to the adoption of gender-based pricing, the
ideology of separate spheres for men and women was contested, and sometimes
also reinforced, through political activism related to abolitionism. 53 In both
Britain and America, women played an important role in anti-slavery
organizing efforts,154 beginning in Britain in the late eighteenth century with a
boycott of slave-grown sugar.15s Women's anti-slavery activism eventually led
them to draw connections between chattel slavery and their own subordinate
position.
As activism on these and other issues increased, gender distinctions also
began appearing in the law more generally. In Great Britain, for example, only
three years after the adoption of gender-distinct rates for the sale of government
annuities, Parliament enacted the 1832 Reform Act, 57 which extended the
franchise to the middle classes and introduced gender as a legal determinant of
enfranchisement for the first time. 58 According to a British historian, the
"fraught politics of class" impeded radicalization of the British abolitionist
movement along gender lines; instead, the construction of British middle class
identity was tied to the promotion of "separate spheres" for men and women,
with women's anti-slavery rhetoric resting "on assertions of their own
privileges as women, and the desire to extend these privileges to others." 59 The
Reform Act was soon followed by the 1833 Act for the Abolition of Slavery,160
which closed down the "possibility for the development of an equation between
the position of women and that of slaves" within Great Britain "at just the time
when it was opening up with the United States."161
152. SENECA FALLS DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS (1848).
153. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 52, at 1098-1112.
154. DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 147, at 433.
155. David Brion Davis, Declaring Equality: Sisterhood and Slavery, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND
TRANSATLANTIC ANTI-SLAVERY IN THE ERA OF EMANCIPATION 3, 11 (Kathryn Kish Sklar & James
Brewer Stewart eds., 2007). See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND
FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 234-38 (2006).
156. Davis, supra note 155, at 11; see also I HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848-1861, at 13
(Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds.,1887).
157. An Act to Amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4,
c. 45 §§ 19-20 (Eng.) [hereinafter 1832 Reform Act].
158. Id. Sections XIX and XX refer to "every Male Person of full Age and not subject to any legal
Incapacity. . . shall be entitled to vote. . . " and Section XXVII refers to the rights of voting in Boroughs
for the male residents of the city or borough. Id. See, e.g., SHOEMAKER, supra note 147, at 231-32; T.
Chisholm Anstey, On Some Supposed Constitutional Restraints Upon the Parliamentary Franchise
(1867), reprinted in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN THE MODERN ERA 19-27 (David S.
Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne eds., 1978). Prior to that time, civic rights had been class and land
based; the wives of English lords or ladies of reigning families could exercise under certain
circumstances powers that were attached to the land or throne. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF
WOMEN 23, 103-04 (1869).
159. Clare Midgley, British Abolition and Feminism in Transatlantic Perspective, in
TRANSATLANTIC ANTI-SLAVERY, supra note 155, at 121, 125.
160. An Act for Abolition of Slavery Throughout the British Colonies, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73
(Eng.).
161. Midgley, supra note 159, at 126.
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In America, by contrast, the fierce debates surrounding the place of women
in the abolitionist movement provided a backdrop against which other powerful
institutional forces emphasized the domestic and dependent role of women.
Women who played increasingly public roles in the anti-slavery movement
later emerged as leaders in the nascent American woman's rights movement.162
Before the "first wave" of woman's rights activism took hold, however, the
"woman question" provoked fundamental disagreement among American
abolitionists.
Elizur Wright, who recommended to Massachusetts Hospital Life that the
British approach to gender-distinct life annuity tables and rates be imported
into the United States, was actively involved in these abolitionist debates. In
1839, disagreement about the role of women and of woman's rights in the
abolitionist movement divided abolitionist organizations. Elizur Wright initially
argued for a pragmatic middle way between those who believed women should
be barred from politics and the more absolutist views of William Lloyd
Garrison, who viewed woman's rights to be a moral issue like slavery.163
Although Wright publicly supported the activist role of women such as
Lucretia Mott and the Grimk6 sisters,164 he privately admitted to being most
comfortable with the conventional pattern of gender relationships. For example,
in a 1838 letter to another abolitionist, Wright observed, "'I think the tom-
turkies ought to do the gobbling, I am opposed to hens' crowing, and surely, as
a general rule, to female-preaching;' [but] . . . if some women insisted on acting
the part of men they should be permitted to do so; nature would assert itself in
the end."165 He believed the "woman question" to be a false issue diverting
attention away from freeing the slave, writing that it "belittles us-it is tying a
tin kettle to the tail of our enterprise."' 66
In 1839, Wright became editor of the Massachusetts Abolitionist in Boston,
a factional competitor of Garrison's paper, the Liberator. As the rift among
factions deepened, Wright joined the traditionalists in opposing any action on
the "woman question." 67 In a confidential letter to Henry Stanton in October
1839, which later fell into the hands of Garrison, Wright complained that
"[e]verything has been made to turn upon the woman question," and that "[tihe
162. See, e.g., BRUCE DORSEY, REFORMING MEN AND WOMEN: GENDER IN THE ANTEBELLUM
CITY 136-94 (2002); BETH A. SALERNO, SISTER SOCIETIES: WOMEN's ANTISLAVERY ORGANIZATIONS
IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 4-7 (2005); JUDITH WELLMAN, THE ROAD TO SENECA FALLS (2004).
163. David B. Houston, Elizur Wright: The Man and His Work, 26 J. INS. 11, 16 (1959).
164. See, e.g., GERDA LERNER, THE GRIMKE SISTERS FROM SOUTH CAROLINA: PIONEERS FOR
WOMAN'S RIGHTS AND ABOLITION (1967) (describing the public roles assumed by the sisters Angelina
Grimk6 and Sarah Grimk6, who had first-hand experience with slavery on their family's plantation, and
recounting their contacts with Quaker activist Lucretia Mott).
165. AILEEN S. KRADITOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM 61 n.75 (1969)
(quoting from a letter dated July 11, 1838, from Wright to Amos Phelps).
166. GOODHEART, supra note 112, at 104-05 (citing letters from Wright dated 1837-38 and an
October 20, 1846 issue of The Chronotype, a Boston paper edited by Wright).
167. Houston, supra note 163, at 15.
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political has been left to fall out of sight."168 When the American anti-slavery
movement splintered over this issue, the Garrisonians retained control over the
American Anti-Slavery Society, which Wright had helped found, and
Garrison's opponents formed a competing organization, the American and
Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. Wright ultimately sided against the Garrisonians
and with the opposition.169
Following the practice of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, the
American organization's constitution established separate women's societies,
which were to be represented by male delegates at conventions. 170 The British
and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society demonstrated its support of the new
American organization by refusing to seat women delegates from the
Garrisonian society at its World Anti-Slavery Convention in 1840. At the
convention, Garrison expressed his support of woman's rights and his
opposition to the position of the new American organization and its British
counterpart by sitting with the female delegates in the visitors' gallery.
Significantly, after their experience in London Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth
Cady Stanton resolved to hold a woman's rights convention in the United
States, leading to the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848. Looking back on that
time period, Stanton also listed the reform of property rights of married women
as an immediate cause of the demand for equal political rights for women,
stating that the "press and pulpit became suddenly vigilant in marking out
woman's sphere, while woman herself seemed equally vigilant in her efforts to
step outside the prescribed limits."l 72
The role of women in the abolitionist movement, as well as women's
increased activism in support of their own legal and political rights, exposed
the underlying theoretical tension between property rights and equality of
contract for married women and certain free labor arguments against slavery.
As pointed out by historians of that period, abolitionist theorists developed
arguments against slavery by challenging theories of contract that equated wage
168. GOODHEART,supra note 112, at 110.
169. Lucretia Mott later noted that "prominent abolitionists who had before given countenance to
the Grimkes" in the division within the Society beginning in New England in 1837-38, "either secretly
or more openly acted against woman's co-operative action with men" and that Elizur Wright, the
Tappans, and others in New York united in 1839-40 with the New England opposition. Letter from
Lucretia Mott to Elizabeth Cady Stanton (Mar. 16, 1855), in SELECTED LETTERS, supra note 150, at 233.
170. KRADITOR, supra note 165, at 52; Kathryn Kish Sklar, "The Throne of My Heart: " Religion,
Oratory, and Transatlantic Community in Angelina Grimki's Launching of Women's Rights, 1828-1838,
in TRANSATLANTIC ANTI-SLAVERY, supra note 155, at 211, 220.
171. Sklar, supra note 170, at 220. Stanton later wrote that the convention gave "rise to the
movement for women's political equality in both England and the United States." ELIZABETH CADY
STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE 82 (1898).
172. 1 THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848-1861, at 52 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds.,
1887). The Seneca Falls Convention took place shortly after the enactment by New York of the Married
Women's Property Act of 1848. See supra Part II.A.
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labor and marriage as relations of household dependency.173 The wage laborer
or "servant," Locke had written, puts himself "into the family of his master, and
under the ordinary discipline thereof"l 74 and a husband's authority over his
wife mirrored that of "a master over his servant."175 During the first half of the
nineteenth century, as explained by Morton Horwitz, there was a "gradual
decay" of a "paternalistic and hierarchical relationship among employers and
workers" and the subsequent development of a contractarian framework, in
which "equal bargaining power inevitably became established as the
inarticulate major premise of all legal and economic analysis."l76
Anti-slavery theorists disrupted the analogy between hired men and wives
by distinguishing between "the formal freedom and equality of contracting
parties in the marketplace [and] the benevolent dependencies of the home-an
antithesis symbolized by separate spheres." 77 These theorists argued that by
eliminating slavery, a dependency distinguished by the lack of freedom in
entering the master's service, the wage contract would sustain the marriage
contract by permitting former slaves to enter into free labor contracts to
maintain their own homes and families, an important element of self-
ownership. The household, a place of traditional family dependencies and male
mastery, would be a sphere insulated from the marketplace. Unlike pro-slavery
theorists, abolitionists thus dissociated the free labor contract from the domestic
dependency of bondage and the marriage contract. 78
Some feminist abolitionists, particularly in the black anti-slavery
community, strongly challenged that distinction,1 79 arguing that a married
woman should also possess the right to self-ownership, rather than simply
being an object of her husband's contract rights.'80 In addition, woman's rights
activists argued for economic equality within the marriage contract itself. The
dominant view, however, sharply distinguished between freedom and equality
of contract in the marketplace and the benevolent dependency of the home.
Insurance contracts for married women, whether covering their own lives
or those of their husbands, posed the theoretical problem of how the
dependencies of the home could be reconciled with notions of equality and
freedom of contract in the marketplace. That issue was initially resolved soon
after married women's contract rights were recognized in this context by an
increased emphasis in commercial insurance contract terms on differences
173. STANLEY, supra note 18, at 18 n.38. Stanley explains that abolitionism "reshaped the meaning
of contract freedom by dissociating wage labor from relations of personal dependency .... " Id. at 18.
174. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 47 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-
Merrill Co. 1975) (1690).
175. Id. at 4.
176. HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 208, 210.
177. STANLEY, supra note 18, at 166.
178. Id. at 21.
179. Id. at 29-35.
180. See id. at 30-31 (describing the arguments of Frances Ellen Watkins Harper).
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between men and women which comported with traditional gender hierarchies
and dependencies. The gender ideology of separate spheres for men and women
fit within dominant religious as well as more traditionalist abolitionist
perspectives, and framed the legal, political, and economic issues faced by the
woman's rights movement after the Civil War.
111. REINFORCING THE DEPENDENCIES OF THE HOME, 1870-1920
This Part argues that the use of gender-based risk classifications by the
insurance industry during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
reflected and reinforced evolving legal and social views about gender relations.
After the Civil War, with the end of slavery and expansion of insurance
markets, the use of gender-distinct rates for life annuities became more
widespread as that market slowly grew, and certain other gender-based and
race-based pricing practices began to appear in other life insurance markets. By
the end of the nineteenth century, the gender-related pricing patterns developed
during the antebellum period had become more entrenched within the insurance
industry as surviving aspects of coverture continued to be challenged and
reinforced in legal, political, and social settings.
The following sections summarize the evolution of specific pricing
practices in different markets for life insurance, including industrial life
insurance aimed at the working class, ordinary life insurance for the middle
class, and the relatively smaller market for life annuities. Examination of
pricing in a range of life insurance markets, including insurance products sold
to lower-income wage earners, reveals overall patterns not apparent when
focusing on the characteristics of each separate market. The last section argues
that although these pricing patterns can be partially explained by economic
pressures and product differences, they cannot be fully explained by such
factors. Instead, a more complete understanding of the overall patterns can be
achieved when they are also seen as a reflection and reinforcement of the
evolving ideology of separate spheres for men and women.
A. Industrial Life Insurance: Unisex Rates in Working Class Markets
Beginning in the 1870s, newly formed American life insurance companies,
including Prudential, Metropolitan Life, and John Hancock,' 8' sold small
individual life insurance policies to a growing market of low-income working
181. The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company was formed in 1862, a decade before the
other two companies, and began selling "industrial" or "weekly premium" insurance in 1879. JOHN
HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO., JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY: THE
FIRST SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS 10 (1937); EMIL SCHWAB, THE JOHN HANCOCK: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH
18,39, 76 (1912).
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class wage earners.182 This type of life insurance, called variously "industrial,"
"weekly premium," "debit," or "burial" insurance, provided protection against
the financial burden of a last illness and burial for the "industrious" or wage-
earning classes.'83
In that same decade, the difficulty that male workers had in earning enough
to support their families, heightened by the economic depression of 1873,
became an increasing concern to social reformers.184 The inability of working
class men to support their families without the supplemental wage labor of
wives and children revealed the tension inherent in the link identified by
abolitionists between contract freedom in the wage labor market and male
mastery in the home.185
American industrial life insurance companies initially patterned their
business on British industrial life insurance companies that grew out of the
"friendly" and insurance societies developed in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century England.' 86 After a British House of Commons committee in 1853
reported on the defects of the friendly societies and burial clubs and on the need
for more dependable life insurance for the working classes, the Prudential
Assurance Company of London, which had previously sold ordinary life
insurance, opened an industrial branch in 1854.187 The company sold individual
life insurance policies with weekly premiums collected from the families of
wage-earners. The early commercial companies operating in this market in
Great Britain insured men, women, and children.189
The newly formed American insurance companies modeled their
operations after British Prudential' 90 by selling weekly premium industrial life
182. Although twenty different companies issued industrial insurance in 1905, Metropolitan,
Prudential, and John Hancock accounted for ninety-five percent of this business and industrial insurance
constituted about seventeen percent of all life insurance. See Roger L. Ransom & Richard Sutch, Tontine
Insurance and the Armstrong Investigation: A Case ofStifled Innovation, 1868-1905, 47 J. ECON. HIST.
379, 385 n.15 (1987).
183. MALVIN E. DAVIS, INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 6(1944).
184. STANLEY, supra note 18, at 138-217.
185. Id. at 153 (citing, among other studies, a report by the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor
Statistics on the condition of working families published in 1874 stating that this unnatural situation
"unsexed men and women" and threatened coming generations by drawing whole families into the labor
market).
I 86. See Elizabeth Kowaleski Wallace, The Needs of Strangers: Friendly Societies and Insurance
Societies in Late Eighteenth-Century England, 24 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE 53 (2000).
187. DAN M. MCGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 713-14 (rev. ed. 1967). According to Hoffman, the
Prudential Assurance Company of London in 1854 absorbed a company founded in 1849 called the
"Industrial and General." FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA (INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE) 1875-1900, at 5 (1900).
188. HOFFMAN, supra note 187, at 3-5.
189. See, e.g., id. at 24; H.W. Andras, The Rise and Progress of Industrial Assurance, in
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LIFE ASSURANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, BEtNG A SUPPLEMENT TO
THE INSURANCE GUIDE AND HAND-BOOK 78, 79-83, 88 (5th ed. 1912) (discussing controversy over
insuring young children).
190. In America, Prudential began in a basement in Newark in 1875 as the Prudential Friendly
Society and two years later changed its name to the Prudential Insurance Company of America.
Metropolitan Life, which at that time provided life insurance for a mutual assistance and social
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insurance to working class families.191 Policies covered poor wageworkers and
their families, including newly emancipated slaves,192 women and children.193
Industrial insurance agents typically sold policies door-to-door in an assigned
geographical area or "debit," and collected premiums of a few cents each week
to cover each insured member of the household.194 Rates or benefits varied by
age'95 and policies were issued with few restrictions or requirements.196
This less restrictive approach differed from the underwriting practices then
in effect for ordinary life insurance. Early ordinary life policies issued by the
John Hancock Mutual Insurance company, for example, contained restrictions
not found in its industrial policies relating to employment in hazardous
occupations, such as mining, powder manufacturing, or working on railroad
trains and steamboats. 197 Although women remained a relatively small market
for most ordinary life insurance companies until the mid-twentieth century, 198
approximately half of those insured by major industrial insurance companies in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were female,' 99 about the same
organization serving German immigrants, the Hildise Bund, began selling policies on the English
Prudential model several years later. MARQUIS JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE, A STUDY IN BUSINESS
GROWTH 43-44, 61, 73-93 (1947).
191. See, e.g., id. at 61, 73-74.
192. Id. at 338 (discussing coverage of newly emancipated slaves by Metropolitan and Prudential in
the 1870s and early 1880s).
193. HOFFMAN, supra note 187, at 79-83 (noting that of Prudential's first thousand applications for
industrial insurance coverage in 1875-76, about one third were on lives of children under the age often,
one third to cover adult males, and one third to cover adult females).
194. DAVIS, supra note 183, at 7.
195. Frederick L. Hoffman, Industrial Insurance, 26 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 103,
116-18 (1905).
196. Industrial policies were approved on the basis of less detailed applicant information than
ordinary insurance, and generally without medical examinations unless recommended by the soliciting
agent. MCGILL, supra note 187, at 712-13. Although early industrial insurance policies contained some
restrictive standard terms, those restrictions were relaxed over time. See DAVIS, supra note 183, at 9-10
(discussing the elimination of restrictive clauses in early industrial policies); HOFFMAN, supra note 187,
at 229; KELLER, supra note 38, at 55.
197. See HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, A HALF CENTURY COMPLETED, 1862-1912, at 69-71 (1912).
198. See INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 16 (1954) (observing that "[w]hile life
insurance has been written on the lives of women from the start of the business, it is only in the past
generation that women have bought policies in any appreciable volume"). The Fact Book reports that of
the aggregate life insurance in force at the end of 1953, women owned $23.8 billion or 13% of total
regular ordinary life insurance, $8.4 billion or 12% of the total regular group insurance, and $17.3
billion or 46% of total industrial insurance in force. Id. By comparison, during the decade beginning in
1840, less than five percent of New York Life and Trust Insurance Company's new policyholders were
women, and during 1844 to 1850, only two percent of New England Mutual Life Insurance Company's
policyholders were female. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 178-79 tbls.l & 2, 182 tbl.3.
199. See LOUis 1. DUBLIN, EDWIN W. KOPF & GEORGE H. VAN BUREN, MORTALITY STATISTICS OF
INSURED WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR FAMILIES: EXPERIENCE OF THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY INDUSTRIAL DEPARTMENT, 1911 TO 1916, IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 4 tbl.1
(1919) [hereinafter DUBLIN ET AL., MORTALITY STATISTICS] (reporting that nearly half, or 47.8% of
Metropolitan's insured lives were white females and 6.8% were "colored" females); HOFFMAN, supra
note 187, at 306 (reporting that 48.8 percent of the total number of decedents in the industrial experience
of Prudential during 1891-1898 were females, compared to the sex distribution of the total mortality in
the United States reported by the census of 1890 of 47.8 percent females); see also Louis 1. DUBLIN ET
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proportion as in the general population. The majority of women insured by
industrial policies worked as housekeepers; however, these policies also
covered dressmakers, seamstresses, clerks, nurses, saleswomen, milliners, silk
workers, book-binders, storekeepers, stenographers, musicians, and artists.200
By contrast, insurance companies sold ordinary life insurance primarily to
middle class men as a means of protecting their wives and children from
economic insecurity in the event of the premature death of the primary
breadwinner. Unlike the practices at that time in the ordinary insurance
201
market, insurance companies such as Prudential and Metropolitan Life
charged gender-neutral rates for industrial insurance coverage despite the
companies' experience showing differences in mortality rates when
policyholders were classified by gender.
For example, the industrial mortality experience for Prudential
policyholders at the end of the nineteenth century, reported in the combined
categories of gender and race, was more favorable (i.e., it demonstrated a lesser
average mortality) for white women ages twenty-five through fifty-four than
202for white men at the same ages. An early twentieth-century mortality study
conducted by Metropolitan Life found greater mortality of white males than
white females at all ages.203 Beginning with the age period of twenty to twenty-
four years, white male mortality exceeded white female mortality by over
thirteen percent; between twenty-five and thirty-four years, thirty-eight percent;
between thirty-five and forty-four years, "the maximum point of excess in the
mortality of white males over that of white females, namely, over seventy-two
percent."204 The difference between white male and white female mortality
lessened at higher ages but never dropped below twelve percent.20s
Thus, although industrial company mortality experience showed evidence
of greater average mortality rates for white men as compared to white women
at all ages, these companies did not adopt gender-distinct rates or benefits in
AL., THE MORTALITY EXPERIENCE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICYHOLDERS, 1916-1920, at 5 (1923) [hereinafter
DUBLIN ET AL., MORTALITY EXPERIENCE] (compiling mortality statistics from Prudential, John
Hancock, Metropolitan Life, the Life Insurance Company of Virginia, and Colonial Life Insurance
Company of America).
200. HOFFMAN, supra note 187, at 306 (listing occupations of white female decedents in 1897-98).
For a comprehensive study of women's labor force participation and gender differences in earnings and
occupation, see CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
AMERICAN WOMEN 4 (1990) (noting that the labor force participation of young, unmarried women
"increased considerably with America's industrial activity and urbanization" from 1820 to 1920); ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
(1982).
201. See infra Part IlI.B.
202. HOFFMAN, supra note 187, at 311 (reporting Prudential's industrial mortality experience for
1891-98 and listing mortality rates for white males and females as well as the proportion of deaths at
various ages).
203. DUBLIN ET AL., MORTALITY STATISTICS, supra note 199, at 20.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 21.
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selling industrial life insurance policies. Nevertheless, industrial insurance
companies generally followed the pricing practices of other life insurance
companies206 by charging women higher rates when they began selling ordinary
insurance.207
In the absence of contrary indications, unisex rates in industrial insurance
perhaps could be explained by the less restrictive risk assessment practices
found in industrial insurance as compared to the ordinary insurance line of
business. Significantly, however, industrial insurance companies departed from
these less restrictive practices with regard to race. In the early 1880s, the major
industrial life insurance companies began charging race-differentiated
premiums for industrial insurance policies. In states permitting race-based
rates, black men, women, and children were charged more for the same
coverage than were white men, women, and children of the same ages, or
received lesser coverage-at that time, typically two-thirds coverage-for the
-208
same weekly premiums.
A Metropolitan Life study of mortality experience from 1911 to 1916
found greater mortality of black males than white males at nearly all ages.209 In
a pattern similar to that shown for white males and females, the death rate of
black men was higher than that of black women at all ages between twenty-five
and seventy-five (with lower mortality among black males than black females
from ages five to twenty-four); however, the excess was never more than
twenty per cent, and thus more moderate than that observed between white men
and women.210 If gender alone had been used to categorize the mortality data,
the mortality advantage of females over males likely would have been greater
than that shown by the race-categorized gender differentials. Despite
206. See PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA: INSTRUCTIONS TO AGENTS, DESCRIPTION OF PLANS, PREMIUM RATES BY AGES, ETC. FOR
1895, at 8 (providing for "an extra premium of $5 per $1000 annually" for women until the age of 50);
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, RATES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO SPECIAL ORDINARY
AGENTS 1897, at 7 (same, but only until the age of 48). The extra premium amount was not included in
the Ordinary Rate Book and Instructions to Agents for 1908 and 1917, and the Ordinary Rate Book and
Instructions to Agents for 1922 specifically stated on page 378 that "[n]o extra premium is charged on
account of the sex of the insured."
207. KELLER, supra note 38, at 21. By the turn of the century, the Prudential and Metropolitan had
rapidly growing ordinary and intermediate life departments "which appealed with great success to a
lower middle class market untouched by the Big Three." Id. at 12-14 (referring to the Mutual Life
Insurance Company of New York, Equitable, and New York Life as the three big companies at that time
in the ordinary insurance market).
208. Heen, supra note 27, at 375.
209. See DUBLIN ET AL., MORTALITY STATISTICS, supra note 199, at 15. The difference between
mortality rates for black and white males was highest for ages fifteen to twenty-four years, during which
black male mortality rates were more than double those of white men. Id. at 16. For males between
twenty-five and thirty-four years old, black mortality rates were fifty-four percent in excess of those for
white males; between thirty-five and forty-four years, twenty percent in excess; between forty-five and
sixty-four years, sixteen to seventeen percent in excess; between sixty-five and seventy-four years,
nearly six percent in excess; and after age sevety-five white male mortality rates exceeded their black
counterparts. Id. at 16 tbl.7.
210. Id.at2l-22.
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experience showing comparable or greater mortality rate differentials when
industrial policyholders at various ages were classified by gender as opposed to
race, however, industrial insurance companies did not adopt gender-
differentiated premiums or benefits.
Instead, white men remained the "norm" rather than being classified as
"substandard" for rating purposes. Despite men's greater average mortality risk
when compared to women, men other than black men were not treated as
"substandard" risks or charged higher rates for life insurance. 211
In sum, in industrial insurance markets, insurance companies distinguished
between white families and black families after the end of Reconstruction, but
not between men and women with regard to industrial insurance coverage,
rates, or benefits. This left black men with less economic protection for their
families, and thus in both symbolic and practical terms less "mastery" in their
homes, despite the recognition after the Civil War of their equality of contract
under law. In those working class industrial insurance markets, therefore, race
played a more prominent role than gender in the insurance pricing practices
adopted from the end of Reconstruction to the modem civil rights era. The role
played by race in this market paralleled the role played by gender distinctions
in the market for life annuities, where equality in the marketplace challenged
the status hierarchies or traditional dependencies of the household. The
inconsistency of practice between working class and middle class insurance
markets highlights the role that pricing distinctions played in reinforcing both
gender and race status relationships.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, as observed by Louis Brandeis
in his Progressive Era study of industrial insurance, industrial policies
constituted a large proportion of life insurance policies then outstanding.212
Social reformers like Brandeis sharply criticized the marketing practices213 and
high cost of industrial insurance. Brandeis argued that industrial insurance
placed an undue burden on working people through high management
expenses, high lapse rates, and premiums double those payable for any given
amount of coverage acquired through ordinary life insurance policies. Brandeis
urged the establishment of "savings bank life insurance" as an alternative to
industrial insurance. 214
211. In other words their gender, in the absence of other factors, did not place them in a
substandard risk classification.
212. Before being appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States, Louis Brandeis proposed
legislative reforms aimed at industrial insurance. Louis D. Brandeis, Wage-Earners' Life Insurance,
COLLIER'S: THE NAT'L WKLY., Sept. 15, 1906, reprinted in ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE BRANDEIS
WAY: A CASE STUDY IN THE WORKING OF DEMOCRACY 311 app. 2, 312 (1938).
213. See, e.g., WILBY HEARD, CONFESSIONS OF AN INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE AGENT 14 (1911)
(observing that the "policies are generally taken out by women, who are easy victims, owing mostly to
their lack of worldly knowledge").
214. Brandeis, supra note 212, at 314-15; see, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A
LIFE 155, 163, 165-80 (2009).
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The industrial insurance companies defended their practices against this
criticism, pointing to improvements in the policy contract:
The Industrial contract, or policy, of today is a very different document
from the policy issued in 1875. The Industrial policy now provides for
paid-up insurance after three years, for additional benefits after five
years, for cash dividends after fifteen years, and for cash surrender
values after twenty years. There are no restrictions as to hazardous
occupations, residence, and death from suicide, consumption, heart
disease, etc. Improvements in the policy contract have been made
retroactive to existing policy holders.
In addition, these companies argued that industrial insurance permitted millions
of wage-earners who would not be acceptable risks for other types of life
insurance coverage to make a start toward economic security, 216 leading
eventually to other forms of savings or to the purchase of ordinary insurance
coverage sufficient to carry the family through hard times.m
Industrial insurance remained an important form of life insurance for low-
income wage earners until the mid-twentieth century, when the business began
to decline.218 In the mid-twentieth century, the increased wages of workers led
to an expanding market of potential policyholders for ordinary insurance as
well as a gradual merging of individual industrial insurance customers into the
employee group life insurance market, in which life insurance coverage is
219purchased by employers as a benefit for their workers. As incomes improved
for the wage-earning working classes, the major industrial life insurance
companies increasingly aimed their individual policy marketing efforts at new
members of the middle class.220
B. Ordinary Life Insurance, 1870s to 1890s: Higher Rates for Women
After the Civil War, as markets for ordinary insurance expanded and
included greater numbers of women as potential customers, some life insurance
215. John F. Dryden, President, The Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Statement made to
Select Committee of the New Jersey Senate Appointed to Investigate Life Insurance: Industrial
Insurance 24 (July 19, 1906).
216. Id.atl2,32.
217. HOFFMAN, supra note 187, at 284-91.
218. Despite its importance in proportion to overall numbers of policy holders, industrial insurance
remained a small proportion of the dollar amount of insurance in force. KELLER, supra note 38, at 286
tbl. 11.
219. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 38, at 16-52; MCGILL, supra note 187, at 715.
220. See, e.g., MCGILL, supra note 187, at 715-16.
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companies began declining to insure female risks221 and many of those
accepting such risks charged women higher rates based on perceived greater
222
mortality risks resulting from childbirth. These types of life insurance
223
practices had also appeared in Great Britain during this time period.
Although British associations of actuaries collected information in the 1860s on
female customers, no British company made use of it, and according to Alborn,
"[tlhe newly standard Healthy Males [mortality] table consigned women to
statistical limbo in which extra premiums were set more or less arbitrarily
based on a combination of medical opinion, actuarial guesswork, and
haggling."224
In Great Britain, these insurance pricing practices coincided with a more
22general concern about maternal mortality.225 Although national data on
maternal deaths first became available in Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth
century,226 in the United States, by contrast, national vital statistics did not
become available until well into the twentieth century due to the
incompleteness of birth and death registrations.227 Nevertheless, American
practices tended to echo those of British companies despite, or perhaps because
of, deficiencies in American mortality data.
In the early 1870s, Alexander Delmar, director of the United States Census,
criticized the life insurance industry's assumptions regarding women's greater
mortality as unfounded, pointing out that "insurance companies are incorrect in
assuming that women, during their child-bearing period, are subject to greater
risk of death than men during the parallel period of life."228 In response, an
industry spokesman acknowledged that women did on average live longer than
men but then pointed to the adverse mortality experience of the smaller group
of women who sought life insurance.229 Insurance companies maintained that
221. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 107-08; HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON & ORANGE A. SMALLEY,
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE: A CENTURY OF TRUSTEESHIP 74 (1957) (reporting that Northwestern
Mutual Life began to decline female risks in 1876).
222. See, e.g., CLOUGH, supra note 79, at 85.
223. ALBORN, supra note 12, at 117.
224. Id. (referring to the Healthy Males table, adopted in 1869, and the practice, depending on the
company, of excluding women, charging them extra during their child-bearing years, or charging unisex
rates). In the United States, a study of American policyholder mortality, which had been inspired by an
earlier British study, resulted eventually in the American Experience Table of 1868. Id. at 111.
225. LOUDON, supra note 34, at 234, 235. According to this study, peaks in maternal mortality in
1874 and 1893 in Great Britain correlated with deaths from puerperal fever which reflected "changes in
streptococcal virulence in the community" and the transfer of streptococci to lying-in mothers. Id. at
237-38.
226. Detailed national data on maternal deaths first became available in England and Wales in
1850, and later in Scotland and Ireland. Id. at 234.
227. Id. at 265-95.
228. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 44 (quoting Alexander Delmar's statement as reported in May
Women Insure?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1871, at 8).
229. Id.; see also WILLIAMSON & SMALLEY, supra note 221, at 74 (attributing the differences in
risk not to differences in life expectancy but to "a high proportion of 'self-selected' risks among
women.").
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their female policyholders experienced a mortality rate much worse than that of
women in the general population.230
Some in the insurance business hypothesized that this difference arose
from the difficulty of getting an adequate personal examination due to the
"delicacy necessary in such cases," the greater knowledge of the husband of the
wife's condition, the lack of pecuniary interest, or selection against the industry
by less healthy risks.23' A report written in 1872 for the New York Life
Insurance and Trust Company, however, "suggested that the 'repugnance' of
companies to insure females was based upon an erroneous opinion that the
mortality rate for women under fifty (before menopause) was higher than that
for men."232
At that time, ordinary life insurance companies covering female risks
typically had a very small percentage of policies covering women 233 and
imposed surcharges on women of child-bearing age. Mutual Life Insurance
Company of New York, for example, charged women of childbearing age an
234
extra premium of one-half of one percent of the amount insured. At least one
other company countered the trend and advertised that they insured women at
the same rate as men.235
By the end of the century, however, this trend had reversed itself, mirroring
broader social and cultural developments immediately prior to the Progressive
Era.236 The majority of companies began to charge the same rates for male and
female risks, but with restrictions on policy amounts and duration.237 About a
quarter of insurance companies retained an extra premium for women's
policies238 and a few still declined female risks.239 Many of these restrictions
were removed over time as experience showed that the "ancient life insurance
tradition" or "old belief' was "entirely untrue or at least greatly
230. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 43; see also I BULEY, supra note 86, at 398-99 n. 130.
231. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 43.
232. ANITA RAPONE, THE GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 1860-1920: A HISTORY OF A
GERMAN-AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 34-35, 89 (1987) (describing mortality tables constructed by John
Frederic Entz showing that women's life expectancy exceeded men's at age 37 or 38, and noting that the
Gennania Life Insurance Company-renamed Guardian Life during the World War I period-dropped
the extra premium on women's ordinary life policies in the late 1890s).
233. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 44.
234. CLOUGH, supra note 79, at 85 (referring to policies in 1858, 1865, and 1886); see also Paul F.
Clark, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, A Ninetieth Anniversary Address, at 10 (Apr. 1,
1952) (stating that in the 1880s, John Hancock "took a dim view of female risks" and that the "actuary
reported that such risks were not desirable and the extra premium of one-half of one per cent charged
none too high" because of excess mortality among women between ages 25 and 35).
235. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 42.
236. See, e.g., ROSALIND ROSENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES: THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS
OF MODERN FEMINISM (1982) (discussing Progressive Era empirical research that questioned then-
dominant assumptions about gender difference).
237. Sharon Ann Murphy, Security in an Uncertain World: Life Insurance and the Emergence of
Modem America, at 111 (Jan. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file
with University of Virginia library).
238. Id.
239. Id. (listing Mutual Benefit ofNew Jersey, Michigan Mutual, and Northwestern Life).
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exaggerated." 240 Even as late as the mid-twentieth century, however, the
amount of life insurance coverage available to married women241 sometimes
242
still depended upon the amount sold to her husband.
C. Life Annuities: Higher Rates for Women
As discussed earlier, at the recommendation of Elizur Wright and the
company's finance committee, the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance
Company led the way in adopting gender-distinct rates for life annuities in the
antebellum period, based on gender-distinct mortality tables constructed by
John Finlaison, of the British government's National Debt Office.243 In contrast
to the increasingly competitive environment in the life insurance business,
MHL did not experience much competition in its annuity business from the
antebellum to the post-Civil War periods. 244 Gerald White has pointed out that
"[1]ife annuities, which had been the least profitable part of the company's
business prior to 1838," showed a profit in all but eleven of the forty years from
1838 to 1878.245 Life annuities became a bigger part of MHL's business by the
end of the nineteenth century (despite the fact that no special attempt was made
to sell them), increasing fivefold in number since 1877 and producing about
five percent of the company's total fund for investment. 246 Life annuities still
covered more women's lives than men's lives, in a ratio of about four to one.247
In 1881, to ensure that this increased business would remain profitable,
MHL began to apply women's life annuity rates to men, increasing rates for the
smaller number of men who purchased annuities.248 However, in 1893, after
consulting with Elizur Wright's son Walter, who then served as actuary of the
New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, MHL revived the use of
240. CLOUGH, supra note 79, at 290. These restrictions were gradually removed by Mutual Life and
"by 1921 most of the selection restrictions on women were removed, and the two sexes began to be
underwritten on nearly the same basis." Id.
241. In addition, some health or disability coverage was difficult or impossible for women to
obtain. Janet Sydlaske, Comment, Gender Classifications in the Insurance Industry, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1381, 1383-86 (1975).
242. JOSEPH B. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 263 (9th ed. 1962) (noting that "[m]any companies
limit the amount of insurance on a dependent married woman to some proportion of the insurance
carried by the husband on his own life" and that "[aill companies underwrite this business strictly."); see
also LOUIs 1. DUBLIN, A FAMILY OF THIRTY MILLION: THE STORY OF THE METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY 105, 131 (1943) (recounting further restrictions placed in the 1930s on "the
writing of insurance on housewives and other dependents, in relation to the amount in force on the head
of the family").
243. See supra Part II.B.
244. WHITE, supra note 89, at 85, 84.
245. Id. at 85 (stating that the company realized profits during these forty years of approximately
$111,000 for annuities and $88,000 for life insurance).
246. Id.at 114-15.
247. Id. at 114.
248. ld. at 114-15. Minutes of the Board of Directors of Mass. Hosp. Life Insurance Co. (May 4,
1881), Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company Collection, AA-I, Case 1. Baker Library
Historical Collections, Harvard Business School.
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separate tables for men and women and increased rates for purchasers at higher
age levels. 249 After an extensive survey of the company's annuity experience by
Walter Wright in 1897, MHL's finance committee recommended the
development of new tables for men and women that would conform more
closely to those recently adopted by several leading New York insurance
250
companies. In addition, the company finally lowered the interest rate
assumptions it had used since the 1820s25 and raised rates, especially at higher
252
ages, to reflect significantly lowered mortality rates at those ages.
The company's new male and female mortality tables for its annuity
business were informed by the experience of fifteen American companies, a
survey of which was reported in the 1890s.253 This survey included nearly
equal numbers of male and female annuitants; however, because the aggregate
foreign annuity business of the American life insurance companies exceeded
their domestic annuity business, about three-fourths of the lives surveyed were
European. 254
In 1899, Emory McClintock of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of
New York published adjusted male and female tables based on this survey.
McClintock compared the American companies' experience against the more
extensive survey of British lives that formed the basis of updated male and
female annuity tables presented by A. J. Finlaison in 1883 and published by the
House of Commons in 1884, as corroborated by more recent data from
255France. McClintock noted that the American survey, with its large proportion
of recently purchased annuities, indicated the "effect of self-selection in
reducing the rate of mortality" but also indicated a "somewhat greater vitality
249. WHITE, supra note 89, at I15.
250. Id. Minutes of the Board of Directors of Mass. Hosp. Life Insurance Co. (Dec. 8, 1897 and
Jan. 5, 1898), Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company Collection, AA- 1, Case 1. Baker Library
Historical Collections, Harvard Business School.
251. WHITE, supra note 89, at 115 (explaining that the firm substituted a three and one half percent
yield used for the four percent yield that had been used by the company in determining rates since the
days of its first actuary, Nathaniel Bowditch, who served from 1823 until his death in 1838). A leading
life insurance text published in 1967 noted that "[u]ntil recent years, companies attempted to hedge
future improvements in annuitant mortality through the use of an unrealistically low interest assumption
in the premium formula"-specifically, through rates substantially lower than those used in the
calculation of life insurance premiums. The text went on to explain that "the effectiveness of this
technique can be judged by the fact that an interest margin of 1/4 per cent is capable of absorbing a
general reduction in mortality of 6 or 7 per cent." Competition among companies had "increasingly
caused the companies to adopt interest assumptions much closer to their actual investment experience."
MCGILL, supra note 187, at 104.
252. WHITE, supra note 89, at 115.
253. The survey results were reported by Rufus Weeks of the New York Life Insurance Company
at the Society of Actuaries meetings in I892 and updated in I894. With Figures and Signs: Actuaries
Meet and Discuss Points in Their Business, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1896, at 9.
254. Id.
255. Emory M'Clintock, Special Tables for the Estimation ofMortality Among Annuitants, Vol. VI,
No. 21, DECENNIAL NUMBER, PAPERS AND TRANSACTIONS, SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES 13 (May 18-19,
1899) (noting that two-thirds of the 30,788 British annuitant lives were women and that the survey of the
fifteen American companies included 4365 males and 4821 females).
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on the whole, which would seem to be the result of the improving physical
conditions of modem life."256 He also observed that "[m]en still young do not
generally purchase annuities for themselves, and that those for whom annuities
are bought by others are not necessarily good risks," and thus, it was reasonable
to suppose that the mortality among men under sixty "would continue to be
rather heavy" and that "there is no reason why rates should not be made
accordingly." 257 In the early twentieth century, McClintock's male and female
annuitant mortality tables became accepted as an industry standard for the
valuation of reserves for life annuities in America.258
The demand for annuity products grew slowly during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century as multi-generational households became less
prevalent, and grew more quickly during the rest of the twentieth century.259
For example, in 1910 individual annuities formed only a small part of the
business of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, a company organized in 1859
by Henry Baldwin Hyde in New York City; they became a progressively larger
share of Equitable's business (as measured by premium receipts) over the next
thirty-five years, and constituted forty percent of the company's total receipts
by 1945.260 A big player in annuity markets, Equitable charged gender-distinct
rates in this line of business. 261
The big industrial life insurance companies, despite charging unisex rates
for industrial life insurance coverage, followed the general industry practice of
gender-distinct pricing for annuities. Metropolitan Life adopted gender-based
pricing for annuities in 1907, after the standardization of annuity tables for
valuation purposes. According to a company history, these new rates
"embraced separate tables for males and females-a much more equitable
arrangement, in view of the demonstrated superiority in the longevity of female
annuitants."262 When the John Hancock Company pursued the annuity market
in 1922, the company charged gender-distinct rates.263 That same year,
256. Id. at 13-14.
257. Id. at 14.
258. Many states, including New York, incorporated McClintock's annuity tables as a valuation
standard in their state insurance laws. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 271 U.S. 109, 120
(1926).
259. See generally James M. Poterba, A Brief History of Annuity Markets, in THE ROLE OF
ANNUITY MARKETS IN FINANCING RETIREMENT 26 (Jeffrey R. Brown et al. eds., 2001).
260. In 1925, only four and one-half percent of the Equitable Life Assurance Society's premium
receipts were for annuities; by 1930, annuity receipts constituted eleven percent; in 1935, thirty-two
percent; in 1945, forty percent of all premium receipts. 2 BULEY, supra note 86, at 1154. Equitable's
"individual annuities numbered about 4000 in 1910 but by the end of 1947, the number had increased to
307,894. . . during the same period the annual income at maturity under individual annuities in force
rose from about $1,500,000 to $136,470,345." Id. at 1153.
261. Equitable applied a mortality table for annuity contracts based on the annuitant's age and sex.
Id. at 1261.
262. HALEY FISKE & RAYMOND V. CARPENTER, AN EPOCH IN LIFE INSURANCE, TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 49-50 (1917).
263. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO., supra note 181, at 41.
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Prudential's rate books and instructions to agents contained sex-differentiated
annuity rate tables.2
In summary, by the time women gained the right to vote in the 1920s,
higher prices for women in the annuity market had become a well-established
commercial practice. Most companies at that time charged unisex rates for life
insurance coverage but imposed higher rates for women seeking annuity
income protection during their lives.
D. Post-Civil War Pricing Patterns Reinforced Separate Spheres Ideology
As set forth at the end of Part II, gender-distinct pricing practices, with
higher rates for women's lifetime annuities, first appeared in elite and middle
class markets during the antebellum period as gender roles were being
challenged on legal, social, and political fronts. After the Civil War, the
ideology of separate spheres, although challenged by some woman's rights
activists, became even more entrenched in law and custom. For working class
women, however, the separation between home and marketplace blurred in
certain respects as increasing numbers of states recognized the right to wage
earnings for those married women265 whose husbands were unable to provide
fully for their support.266
The intellectual underpinnings of gender ideology also shifted from the
antebellum years to the period following the Civil War and up to 1920, as did
the social issues of most concern to the elite and middle-class men and women
who purchased ordinary life insurance and annuity products. A few key issues,
briefly summarized below, serve as examples of how prevailing legal,
scientific, and cultural views about gender difference developed during that
time and of the impact of those views more generally on the roles and
opportunities available to women.
As mentioned in Part 1, studies of patterns of civil rights reform by legal
historians have shown that civil rights struggles sometimes create feedback that
may transform former status hierarchies into more private, modernized
267forms. As Reva Siegel has pointed out, "[C]ivil rights reform does not
simply abolish a status regime; but in important respects, it modernizes the
rules and rhetoric through which status regimes are enforced and justified."268
After the Civil War, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly interpreted
264. PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, ORDINARY RATE BOOK AND
INSTRUCTIONS TO AGENTS 344-47 (1922).
265. Siegel, supra note 25, at 2130-31, 2168-96.
266. STANLEY, supra note 18, at 175-217.
267. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
268. Reva Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.
2117,2179 (1996) (examining the evolution of domestic assault law from a law of marital prerogative to
a law of marital privacy).
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the national citizenship rights of former slaves. It distinguished between the
political rights of citizenship and private associational affinities, 269 ushering in
the Jim Crow era of state-sanctioned racial segregation until the mid-twentieth
century.
The Court also narrowly interpreted the national citizenship rights of
women, upholding states' denial of suffrage 27 0 and exclusion of women from
the legal profession271 in rulings that reflected prevailing notions of separate
spheres for men and women. When the U.S. Supreme Court held that states
could deny women admission to the bar without abridging the privileges and
immunities of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, for
example, the concurring opinion by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Bradley
observed that "the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman." 272
Justice Bradley noted with approval the importance given by the state court to
Bradwell's incapacity under coverture to enter into express or implied contracts
with clients.273
Although woman's rights activists continued to advocate for equality of the
marriage contract after the Civil War, 274 distinctions between the affection and
maternal nurturing of the home and the business-like freedom and equality of
contract in the marketplace were defined and elaborated during this period. In
the early twentieth century, women's groups achieved certain legal reforms
including protective labor legislation,275 mothers' pensions,276 and later
suffrage,277 in part by extending the ideology of women's separate spheres of
moral and domestic influence into formerly foreclosed public, political, and
economic realms.
269. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544, 551 (1896); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protected only "privileges or immunities" conferred by the
United States and not those of state citizenship).
270. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding that Missouri's refusal to allow Virginia
Minor to register to vote did not violate her rights as a citizen under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE
LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 92-123 (1998) (describing the campaign of the
women's rights movement in the 1870s to test women's voting rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
271. Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding the state's exclusion of women
from the practice of law).
272. Id. at 141.
273. Id. (observing that "[t]his very incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court of
Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties and
trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counsellor.").
274. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 52, at 1146-89.
275. Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1907).
276. Sometimes referred to as "widows' pensions," mothers' pensions were enacted by twenty state
legislatures in 1911-13, and by forty states by 1920. They authorized local governmental authorities to
make payments to poor widowed mothers of dependent children to cover at least part of the cost of
raising such children in their own private homes. THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND
MOTHERS 424 (1992).
277. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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In upholding state legislation protecting women workers, for example, the
Court emphasized "woman's physical structure and performance of maternal
functions," noting that "the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of
public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race,"
placing her "in a class by herself;" thus, "legislation designed for her protection
may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and could
not be sustained."278 This language reflects the view that women's reproductive
and maternal functions should be issues of social concern. Related debates
during the post-Civil-War period of woman's rights activism illustrate the
congruence between dominant social and cultural gender norms and the pricing
practices introduced by the insurance industry for women of child-bearing age.
After the Civil War, separate spheres ideology began to emphasize
evolutionary differences and women's specialized biological roles in childbirth
and childrearing. Physical anthropologists for years had measured cranial
capacities and brain weights to show how the mental capacity of the sexes
differed.279 These measurements showed lower brain weights and cranial
capacity for females than for the average male European brain.280 In the 1870s,
ideas about gender difference were increasingly influenced by evolutionary
theory and social Darwinism. A decade after the publication of Darwin's On
the Origin of Species281 and shortly after publication of his Descent of Man,282
middle-class Americans debated the effect of biological difference on women's
social roles and intellectual capacities.283
For example, when a group of Bostonian reformers advocated the
admission of women to Harvard, the ensuing debate focused sharply on
women's biological limitations and reproductive role.284 Dr. Edward Clarke, a
278. Mueller, 208 U.S. at421-23.
279. Cranial capacity measurements had also been performed for several decades in an attempt to
isolate racial differences. STEVEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASUREMENT OF MAN (1981) (describing
scientific racism in the years prior to the Civil War); see also AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN NORTH
AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A WORLDVIEw 231-54 (1993) (discussing nineteenth-century
scientific contributions to ideologies about race).
280. ALEXANDER BAIN, MIND AND BODY: THE THEORIES OF THEIR RELATION 19-20 (18 73)
(comparing the weight of 49.5 ounces for the average European male brain to 44 ounces for the female
brain).
281. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION; OR, THE
PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE (1859).
282. CHARLES DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 35-38 (1871).
283. For some forty years between the publication of Darwin's Origin of the Species and the
development of modem genetics, the "exact nature of sex-differentiation and its psychic accompaniment
was a subject of intense, though inclusive, debate." Jill Conway, Stereotypes ofFemininity in a Theory
of Sexual Evolution, 14 VICTORIAN STUD. 47, 47 (1970) (discussing the influence of the thought of
Spencer, Comte, and Geddes on English and North American sociology). Conway quotes Spencer's
view that "sex-differences could best be understood by assuming 'a somewhat earlier-arrest of
individual evolution in women than in men; necessitated by the reservation of vital power to meet the
cost of reproduction."' Id. at 48, 61 n.2 (quoting Spencer's The Study of Sociology, which was first
published in serial form in England and the United States in 1872).
284. ROSENBERG, supra note 236, at 4-5 (noting that attempts to define sex differences "suddenly
crystallized into a clear exposition of women's physical limitations").
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member of Harvard's Board of Overseers and a former member of its medical
faculty, responded to these reform proposals with the influential argument that
young women's physical health would be damaged by the intellectual rigors of
higher education and that opening up higher education to women would have a
destructive effect on American society as a whole.285 He argued that the mental
strain of college would seriously threaten the development of a young woman's
286
reproductive organs. Those young women who ignored that basic fact of
physiology risked nervous collapse and sterility. 287 In addition, arguing from
the assumption that higher civilization brought greater specialization, Clarke
claimed that the divergence of male and female social roles properly
represented specialization in the realm of sex in which women had their own
sphere of activity.288
At about the same time, some middle-class women were asserting the idea
of voluntary motherhood,289 with women like Elizabeth Cady Stanton urging
290
women to assert control over their own reproductive capacity in marriage.
During the debate over voluntary motherhood, the nineteenth-century campaign
to criminalize abortion, as described by Reva Siegel, "offered a new way of
regulating wives' obligations that was distinct from, but in important respects
consistent with, the traditional body of marital status law being reformed in the
post Civil War period." 291 The campaign provided a new, physiological way of
reasoning about wives' obligations, deriving women's duties from "facts about
the female body" rather than from her husband as her representative in the
social state, and thus defined women's roles as a status conferred by "nature
rather than by the social state." 292
This emphasis on the maternal role of elite and middle-class women, on
their physiological suitability for reproduction and on their susceptibility to
nervous disorders and vulnerability in childbirth, was reflected in commercial
293practice as well as in legal decisions. As discussed above, the insurance
285. EDWARD CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION; OR, A FAIR CHANCE FOR THE GIRLS 21-23 (1873)
[hereinafter CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION]; see also EDWARD CLARKE, THE BUILDING OF A BRAIN
(1874) [hereinafter CLARKE, THE BUILDING OF A BRAIN].
286. ROSENBERG, supra note 236, at 7-9 (discussing the influence of Darwin on Clarke's views).
287. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION supra note 285, at 40, 54.
288. CLARKE, THE BUILDING OF A BRAIN, supra note 285, at 79-84 (arguing that these differences
supported the development of separate educational programs for men and women and that women
should study less than young men).
289. LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL
IN AMERICA 104-11 (1976).
290. Id. at 104-09; see also WILLIAM LEACH, TRUE LOVE AND PERFECT UNION: THE FEMINIST
REFORM OF SEX AND SOCIETY 82-84 (1980).
291. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body. A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 321 (1992).
292. Id.
293. For a discussion of the influence of medical thought in the 1870s and 1880s regarding
conditions known as neurasthenia and hysteria on the development of tort law in this period, and its
connection to the societal view of middle- and upper-class women as frail and often unfit for their roles
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industry mirrored and underscored this emphasis on women's maternal role by
adopting ordinary life insurance surcharges and coverage restrictions on
women of childbearing age, once again borrowing such gender-distinct rate
differentials from Great Britain despite differences in American experience.
When that emphasis declined at the turn of the century, those practices
gradually disappeared in ordinary life insurance markets.
IV. CONCLUSION: LOOKING TOWARD THE SECOND WAVE
Insurance companies resolved the theoretical and practical conflict between
equality of contract in the marketplace and the traditional dependencies of the
home through the selective adoption of gender-distinct pricing. As shown by
inconsistencies in the use of risk assessment in in the pricing of products,
gender-based pricing practices did not result from even-handed application of
actuarial methodology and principles. Nor can they be explained fully by the
characteristics of different markets for life insurance or by variations in the
mortality experiences of policyholders over time. Although those factors had an
impact on the practices that emerged, the origins of gender-based pricing
instead suggest the operation of powerful social and cultural norms.
When differentiated by gender, insurance contract pricing reflected the
categorization of women as different in nature from men, or alternatively, of
lesser economic value apart from their husbands. Separate mortality tables
categorized by gender first appeared in the antebellum period, when anti-
slavery and woman's rights activists challenged the dominant gender ideology
of separate spheres for men and women, and shortly after the enactment of
insurance-related modifications to the common law doctrine of marital unity.
The selective use of these tables resulted in unfavorable rates or lower annual
annuity payments for women, coinciding, not by happenstance, with broader
changes in marital status law and highly contentious national debates about the
proper role of women in American society.
Significantly, gender-distinct mortality tables and rates first appeared in
insurance contracts designed to provide income support for financially
inexperienced and dependent family members in products used to fund
marriage settlements, payments as substitutes for dower rights, or lifetime
support for widows or the elderly. Higher prices or lower benefits for coverage
of women's lives were thus adopted for products used to provide financial
support independent of or as a substitute for marital rights. By adopting gender-
differentiated contract terms for these products, companies translated into new,
modernized form the marital status and dependency relationships previously
as childbearers and childraisers, see Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the
Law of Fright, 88 MICH-. L. REv. 814, 824-26 (1990).
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enforced under the common law of coverture for married women and dower for
widows. The pricing of life annuities remained gender-differentiated, with
separate tables and higher rates (or lower annual benefits) for women, as that
market expanded during the twentieth century. Gender-distinct mortality rates
for annuities became entrenched by the time women won the right to vote,
when suffrage was achieved at least in part through an expansion of separate
spheres ideology into formerly foreclosed political realms. They have remained
a feature of the annuity market outside of the employment setting up to the
present time.
Gender-based coverage restrictions and higher prices for life insurance
coverage of women's lives also began to appear following the Civil War.
Surcharges for women of child-bearing age focused on women's reproductive
capacities at a time when a broader set of legislative changes reduced the role
of the husband as the married woman's legal representative in the marketplace.
Women's specialized biological roles in childbirth and child nurturing became
a special concern for society as a whole, with increased attention paid to
women's reproductive role. In both symbolic and in practical economic terms,
therefore, gender-differentiated pricing practices tempered the freedom and
equality of contract for married women recognized by the expanding state
statutory exceptions to coverture by emphasizing women's biological
difference from men.
When not differentiated by gender, insurance contract pricing reflected the
status of men as providers, who during life were legally obligated to support
their dependent wives and children. Thus, men's lives tended to be used as a
unisex measuring standard for ordinary life insurance products that provided
benefits to dependents upon the family breadwinner's death. The pricing of
industrial insurance, a newly developed individual life insurance product aimed
at the working poor, remained gender-neutral but became race-distinct despite
evidence of mortality differentials when policyholders were classified either by
race or by sex.
Gender-distinct mortality tables, if consistently utilized for contract pricing
purposes, could have supported higher prices or lower benefits for men as
"substandard" risks in the sale of industrial life insurance, where men and
women comprised close to an equal portion of covered lives and men's average
mortality exceeded women's mortality rates at nearly all ages. However, in that
working class market, unisex rates prevailed despite the favorable, lower
mortality rates of female insured lives. These "unisex" pricing policies
reinforced the traditional notion of men as the primary "providers" for their
families, particularly in working class households where women's wages were
sometimes necessary to sustain the family. On the other hand, as I have
explored elsewhere, race-based rates adopted in that market reflected and
reinforced post-Reconstruction views about racial superiority and inferiority,
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and resulted in less financial security for black families than for white
families.294 Thus, in an economic context threatening to white men's mastery in
the home, industrial insurance pricing differentiated on the basis of race rather
than gender, reinforcing along both racial and gender lines the notion of greater
"mastery" for white men in their homes.
Lower favorable rates for women for ordinary life insurance, the mirror
image of higher rates charged to women for life annuities, generally did not
begin appearing in ordinary insurance markets until the late 1950s and early
1960s.295 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, proposed federal legislation to ban
sex discrimination in insurance296 failed at about the same time297 that the
Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Congress in 1972,298 failed to gain
ratification by the requisite number of states. 299
Developments during the "second wave" of women's rights reforms, which
are beyond the scope of this article, raise many questions that merit future
investigation. For example, why did the rationalization and expansion of
gender-distinct insurance pricing follow soon after race-distinct mortality tables
294. Heen, supra note 27.
295. For example, in 1958, the Equitable Life Assurance Society adopted lower premiums on all
plans of life insurance for women in policies of $10,000 and over. 2 BULEY, supra note 86, at 1261-62;
see also MACLEAN, supra note 242, at 263 (observing that "[p]ractically all companies now have lower
rates for women"). Rather than develop separate tables reflecting the mortality experience of women,
companies utilized the updated mortality rates of the 1958 Commissioners Standard Ordinary Mortality
Table, and applied a simple three-year age differential for women. Under a three-year age setback, a
company would sell insurance to a thirty-five-year-old woman at the premium rates applied to a thirty-
two-year-old man without the need to separately calculate non-forfeiture values, policy reserves, and
dividends. Id. at 8, 106, 109; see also MCGILL, supra note 190, at 158-59 (discussing the development
of the 1958 Commissioners Standard Ordinary Mortality Table).
296. See, e.g., H.R. 100, 96th Cong. (1979). H.R. 100, known as the Nondiscrimination in
Insurance Act, was reintroduced in each Congress through 1985, keeping its bill number H.R. 100
through 1983. A similar Senate nondiscrimination bill, the Fair Insurance Practices Act, S. 2204, was
reported to the full Senate from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in December
1982. S. REP. No. 97-671 (1982).
297. Although the 1983 version of H.R. 100 was reported out of the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Transportation and Tourism to the full House Committee on Energy and Commerce in April 1983, and
reported out of the full committee in March 1984, the bill died before reaching the floor. LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, Bill Summary & Status-98th Congress (1983-1984)-H.R. 100.
298. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
299. H.R.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong. 92 Stat. 3799 (1978); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratification ofthe
Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEX. L. REv. 919 & n.2 (1979) (describing the vote by
Congress in 1978, with three states short of the required thirty-eight affirmative votes, to extend the
original 1979 deadline until June 30, 1982). By 1982, only thirty-five of the required thirty-eight states
had approved the Equal Rights Amendment. See, e.g., Dana Canady, Advocates of Equal Rights
Amendment Resume Their Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003, § 1, at 41 (describing ongoing efforts to
revive the ERA ratification effort). Some scholars have argued that the social and legal changes since its
reintroduction in 1972 produced a "de facto" ERA in equal protection jurisprudence. See, e.g., Michael
Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 985 (2002); see also Serena Mayeri, A New
E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment Advocacy and the Reconstitution of Feminism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
1223 (2009) (describing the feminist debate over reviving the ratification effort); Serena Mayeri,
Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755
(2004) (describing and discussing the dual legal strategy of ERA ratification efforts and litigation under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
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and rates were discontinued? How did improving mortality for both men and
women affect the pricing decisions made by the insurance industry? How did
entry of more married women into the wage labor market during that time
contribute to the change? How did the framework for regulation of the
insurance industry influence the use of gender by the industry for pricing and
valuation purposes? How, if at all, did political factors, including state-by-state
ratification debates over the Equal Rights Amendment, contribute to the timing
of the shift from unisex rates to favorable rates for women for ordinary life
insurance?
In any investigation of these and other questions, the antebellum origins
and selective adoption of gender-distinct rates during the "first wave" of
woman's rights activism provide important historical context for understanding
the outcome of second wave debates. Past patterns and influences suggest that
gender-based insurance classifications proved difficult for second wave
women's rights activists to dislodge because of the relationship of insurance to
family dependency and security, the rhetorical neutrality of actuarial language,
and the strength of underlying ideologies of gender.
In America, as married women's capacity to enter into contracts apart from
their husbands became recognized in law, different contract rates for men and
women provided a means to reinforce the notion of fixed "natural" gender
difference. By reflecting traditional gender status hierarchies and dependency
relationships in the pricing policies adopted, these differentials tempered the
law's recognition of women's equality of contract in the marketplace.
384 [Vol. 23:2
